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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Egemen Genc 
 
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
Department of Finance 
 
June 2012 
 
Title: Essays on Mutual Funds 
 
 
My dissertation consists of two essays on mutual funds. The first essay examines 
the role of extreme positive returns on future fund flows using maximum style-adjusted 
daily returns (hereafter MAX) over the previous month. My results suggest that there is a 
positive and significant relation between MAX and future fund flows. The results are 
robust to controls for fund performance, fund size, age, turnover, fund fees, volatility, and 
skewness of fund returns. Of particular interest, this relation exits only in retail funds.  
Moreover, MAX is persistent from one month to the next, but MAX-based investment 
strategies are associated with lower risk-adjusted returns than investors could have 
achieved in otherwise similar funds. Overall, my analysis suggests that mutual fund 
investors are attracted to maximum style-adjusted daily returns, which is in line with the 
theoretical argument that investors exhibit a preference for lottery-like payoffs. These 
investors are successful in achieving a lottery-like return profile, but this strategy is costly 
in terms of expected returns 
The second essay studies the effect of recent and long-term mutual fund 
performance on future fund flows. I document that investors’ response to recent 
performance depends on average long-term performance. In particular, a recent loser 
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fund experiences outflows only if its longer-term performance is also poor. Similarly, 
recent good performance leads to more inflows only if the fund has also good long-run 
performance. In contrast, investors ignore recent performance if it provides a signal that 
conflicts with the longer-term signal. This implies that good fund managers with a 
longer-term focus will find it easier to attract future inflows than managers with a short-
term horizon.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of two essays, which investigate how investors make 
choices in mutual funds.  
In the first essay, I examine the effect of lottery-like fund returns on future fund 
flows. One prominent characteristic of individuals is that they often exhibit a preference 
for lottery-like assets, i.e. assets that have a relatively small probability of a large payoff 
(Barberis and Huang (2008), Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker (2007), Kumar (2009), 
and Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011)). Interestingly, even though the participation of 
individuals in mutual funds has dramatically grown over the last two decades, we have a 
limited understanding if lottery-like preferences play a role in determining fund flows. In 
the first essay, using maximum style-adjusted daily returns (MAX) over the previous 
month as a metric, I show that funds investors are attracted to fund that provide lottery-
like returns. Specifically, I show a positive and significant relation between MAX and 
future fund flows, which is robust to control for other fund characteristics, particularly for 
skewness and volatility of fund returns. This significant relation only exists in retail 
funds, which primarily cater to individual investors. This evidence is consistent with the 
idea that retail investors are more likely to exhibit a preference for lottery-like payoffs 
(Kumar (2009)). In further tests, I find that MAX in a period is a good predictor of MAX 
in the subsequent periods, suggesting that if lottery-like features enter investors’ utility 
functions, then choosing such high MAX funds may be optimal. However, I also 
document that high MAX funds underperform than otherwise similar funds. Thus, fund-
selection strategies based on MAX are costly to investors in terms of expected returns.  
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In the second essay, I investigate the role of short-term and long-term 
performance on future fund flows. Prior literature finds that investors tend to flock to 
fund with recent superior performance (Sirri and Tufano (1998), Gruber (1996)). This is 
consistent with the theoretical model of Berk and Green (2004), who argue that investors 
infer managerial quality from past performance. Even though prior empirical literature 
finds a positive relation between flows and recent performance, this does not differentiate 
between naive return chasing and investor learning. In the second essay, I analyze the 
sensitivity of flows to recent performance conditional on long-term performance. If some 
investors learn from past performance, then there is arguably more information about 
manager skills in returns measured over a longer period compared to returns measured 
over a shorter period. If so, the longer-term performance history may enhance the 
confidence with which investors assess the manager’s ability, and affect the sensitivity of 
flows to recent performance.  
My results suggest that investors' decisions are strongly governed by longer-term 
rather than shorter-term fund performance. In particular, long-term winner funds obtain 
positive net flows, even though they underperform in the recent quarter. Long-term losers 
experience outflows despite a superior performance in the recent quarter. My analysis 
highlights the importance of long-term performance on the shape of the flow-
performance relation. I show that favorable long-term performance strengths the 
sensitivity of flow to recent performance particularly among recent winners. Investors do 
not ignore the poor recent performance. Instead, they put more weight on the positive 
long-term performance. This makes it difficult to properly interpret the relation between 
short-term performance and flows from a model that omits long-term performance.  
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The findings that both long-term performance and lottery-like return affect future 
fund flows is consistent with the idea that consumers adopt a multi-attribute model in 
determining their choices (Fishbein and Azjen (1975), Lanchaster (1966), and Capon, 
Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996)). As a result, the existence of a preference for lottery-like 
returns does not necessarily preclude that some investors would positively value long-
term performance or vice versa. The value that investors attach to long-term performance 
and lottery-like returns may differ among different clientele. I show that the preference 
for lottery-like payoffs only exist in retail funds, which predominantly cater to individual 
investors. Nevertheless, as long as a sizable portion of investors consider these fund 
characteristics in their purchase decisions, we can observe the effect of both fund 
characteristics on fund flows. Accordingly, my tests in each essay show that the effect of 
MAX or long-term performance does not subsume each other, but survive in the presence 
of the other. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXTEREME DAILY FUND RETURNS AND FUND FLOWS 
Introduction 
 The ownership of mutual funds by U.S. households has grown dramatically from 
6% in 1980 to 44% in 2010. An estimated 90 million individual investors owned mutual 
funds and held 87% of total mutual fund assets ($ 11.2 trillion) in 2010.
1
 Moreover, 
French (2008) reports that demand for directly held stocks has been decreasing for most 
of the decade as individuals have increased their reliance on mutual funds. As a result, 
individuals increasingly determine the demand for mutual funds. 
 Understanding individuals' choices in mutual funds is important for several 
reasons. First, investors can indirectly affect stock prices because capital flows into and 
out of mutual funds determine the demand for stocks in the funds’ portfolios. Wermers 
(2004) finds strong evidence that flow-related additions to existing positions push up 
stock prices. Similarly, Coval and Stafford (2007) document that the trading activities of 
funds that experience large inflows or outflows exert price pressure on stocks.
 2
 
Moreover, investors' demand can influence multiple stock prices simultaneously as fund 
managers tend to either increase or decrease their existing positions in response to fund 
                                               
1 See Investment Company Institute Fact Book (2011) (http://www.ici.org/pdf/2011_factbook.pdf ). 
 
2 The authors document that the price pressure is temporary, but the reversal is a slow process that takes 
three to five quarters. This creates considerable profits for liquidity providers and wealth transfer from the 
existing shareholders of the funds to the liquidity providers. In addition, Coval and Stafford (2007) argue 
that price pressure may create some front running incentives, which decrease price efficiency. Consistent 
with the front running arguments, Chen et. al. (2008) find that some hedge funds profit from flow-related 
trading of mutual funds. Therefore, even though the price impact is temporary, it is important since there 
might be a wealth transfer from the existing shareholders of the funds to the liquidity providers or front 
runners. On the other hand, discretionary trading by mutual funds does not cause reversal (see Coval and 
Stafford (2007), and Khan, Kogan, and Serafaim (2011)), and consequently no wealth transfer occurs. 
From this perspective, flows caused by investors’ preferences affect both prices and the wealth of fund 
investors. 
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flows rather than create new stock positions (Pollet and Wilson (2008)). Considering that 
mutual funds are one of the largest groups of investors in U.S. companies, holding 28% 
of the outstanding stocks, the economic impact of flow-induced trading can indeed be 
substantial.  
 Second, since fund managers generally receive a fixed percentage of assets under 
management as a fee, fund flows are the mechanism by which investors influence 
managerial incentives. Consistent with this argument, the literature shows that investors' 
reactions to different fund characteristics drive managers' behavior.
3
 Therefore, 
understanding the role of investors' preferences as a determinant of fund flows is crucial 
in order to decipher managerial actions. Third, financial researchers and practitioners 
generally advocate investing into well-diversified funds with low turnover and low 
expense ratios as a smart investment strategy. Yet, investors seem to ignore some of these 
basic principles, and thus additional evidence on how they choose among funds is useful 
to understand investors’ decision making process per se.  
 One prominent characteristic of individuals is that they often exhibit a preference 
for lottery-like assets, i.e. assets that have a relatively small probability of a large payoff. 
Barberis and Huang (2008) and Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker (2007) develop 
models which provide theoretical motivation for this preference. Kumar (2009) shows 
that certain groups of individuals are inclined to hold lottery-type stocks, which 
subsequently underperform on average. Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) suggest that 
stocks with extreme positive returns attract investors.  
                                               
3 See Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005), 
Sensoy (2009). 
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 In this paper, I investigate the role of extreme positive returns on future fund 
flows using maximum style-adjusted daily returns (hereafter MAX) over the previous 
month. My results suggest that there is a positive and significant relation between MAX 
and future fund flows. The difference in flow ratios, defined as the growth rate of total 
net new money, between funds in the highest and lowest MAX deciles in the univariate 
portfolio analysis is around 0.84% per month. This finding is robust to a battery of 
bivariate and multivariate tests, which control for various fund characteristics including 
performance, total volatility, total skewness, idiosyncratic volatility, idiosyncratic 
skewness, size, age, turnover, marketing costs (i.e. 12b-1), expenses, and load fees. In 
particular, a 1% increases in MAX increases the flow between 0.11% and 0.24% per 
month in multivariate tests. In addition, I obtain similar results when using the average of 
the two, three, four, and five highest daily returns within the month as alternative proxies 
for extreme returns. Finally, I consider a measure defined as the average of single day 
MAX over the past two, three, six, twelve, and eighteen months. The effect of MAX gets 
even stronger when I average over longer periods. Overall, the evidence suggests that 
fund investors may be willing to direct more flows to funds that have recently exhibited 
large positive returns.
4
 
 One interpretation of my findings is consistent with the theoretical models of 
Barberis and Huang (2008), and Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker (2007). Using the 
cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Barberis and Huang 
                                               
4 In order for investors to be attracted to MAX, at least some investors should have access to information 
on daily returns of mutual funds. Many financial sites (i.e. WSJ Fund Screener, Bloomberg U.S. Fund 
Rankings) report daily returns, daily rankings of funds within each investment style as well as historical 
highest and lowest prices and returns within a month. According to the ICI Fact book 2011, 82% of fund 
investors use online sources for financial purposes, mostly to obtain investment information. Therefore, 
besides other possible venues that investors might utilize to reach daily returns of mutual funds, there are 
already publicly available sources that investors can access with minimal effort. 
  
 
7 
 
(2008) argue that investors overweight the tails of asset returns. Brunnermeier, Gollier, 
and Parker (2007) develop a model in which investors choose to increase their beliefs 
about probabilities of positive payoffs in order to maximize their current utility. Both 
models predict that investors overvalue the assets that have a small probability of a large 
positive return 
 In order to better understand the flow-MAX relation, I further categorize funds as 
retail vs. non retail funds and perform the analysis within each group. I find that the flow-
MAX relation exists only among funds catering primarily to retail investors. Specifically, 
when I conduct multivariate tests within retail funds vs. non-retail funds, the coefficient 
of MAX is positive and highly statistically significant only in retail funds, ranging from 
0.133 (t-statistics: 4.26) to 0.241 (t-statistics: 5.45) depending on the specification. 
However, there is no relation between MAX and flows in non-retail funds. In other 
words, preference to extreme returns exists mainly in retail investors, while the relation 
between flow and other fund characteristics such as performance and fees holds for both 
groups. This evidence is consistent with existing results that retail investors are more 
likely to exhibit a preference for extreme payoff states (Kumar (2009)). 
 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that documents the importance 
of preferences for lottery-like features in the distribution of mutual fund returns on 
mutual fund flows. Recently, using a sample of individual investors from a brokerage 
house between 1991 and 1996, Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011) examine whether a 
combination of behavioral factors jointly affects the use of mutual funds in individuals' 
portfolios. They argue that a certain class of investors is affected by behavioral biases. 
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These investors participate less in mutual funds
5
, but when they do, they choose funds 
with relatively high expense ratios and turnover. Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011) do not 
examine, however, the relation between investor decisions and fund flows, or the 
relationship between flows and extreme payoffs. For fund flows to be affected by the 
preference of some investors, collective decisions of these investors must lead to an 
overlay increase or decrease in fund flows, which cannot be corrected by arbitrageurs or 
sophisticated investors. Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011) argue that there are “smart “ 
investors that are not affected by behavioral biases and they make investment decisions, 
which are opposite to the decisions made by the investors with behavioral biases.  
 Therefore, studying fund flows can shed light on the consequences of investors’ 
decisions at the fund level and reveal an important link between investor decision making 
and asset prices as well as investor decision making and managerial incentives. 
Additionally, a sample of a brokerage house may exhibit different characteristics than the 
general population. For example, Bilias, Georgarakos, and Haliassos (2009) find stark 
contrast between the trading behaviors of the investors with brokerage accounts and the 
general population, and argue that the brokerage sample may represent a nonrandom 
sample.
6
 Hence, even though the sample used in Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2011) provide 
                                               
5 Participation is defined as a dummy variable that is equal to one if an investor invests in mutual funds at 
least once during the sample period. 
 
6The authors use Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data that differentiates between investors that hold 
brokerage accounts and the ones that do not hold and also include many characteristics of these investors. 
They find that 20% of overall population holds brokerage accounts and they significantly trade more than 
the general population. Additionally, the investors who own such accounts tend to invest only a small 
fraction of their financial wealth. The median brokerage account as a share of household financial wealth 
for brokerage account owners is around 10% or less, while it is 3.5 % as a share of net total wealth. The 
authors also argue that brokerage account owners may represent a nonrandom sample as the probability of 
having a brokerage account depends on the characteristics of the investors such as education, willingness to 
take above average financial, intention to leave a bequest, children etc. As a result, Bilias, Georgarakos, 
and Haliassos (2009) concluded "…To the extent trading in brokerage accounts induces volatility, 
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unique data on individuals, we need additional research to understand whether the effect 
of investors’ decisions show up at the fund level.  
 This paper also complements many papers that examine various dimensions of 
individuals' fund choices and the determinants of mutual fund flows. Barber, Odean, and 
Zheng (2005) find that investors are more sensitive to in-your-face fees such as loads 
than to operating expenses, which are less visible. Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that 
funds receiving more media attention attract more capital. In a similar vein, Jain and Wu 
(2000) and Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks (2008) provide evidence that funds with higher 
marketing efforts receive more flows, while Del Guercio and Tkac (2008) show the 
response of flows to changes in ratings. Different from the previous literature, my 
analysis links investor preferences for lottery-like features to fund flows and thus, to 
determinants of asset prices.  
 There are empirical studies that support the theoretical models that justify the 
preference for lottery-like payoffs (Barberis and Huang (2008), Brunnermeier, Gollier, 
and Parker (2007)). In a laboratory experiment with a sample of 148 students and 131 
experienced executives, Åstebro, Mata, and Santos-Pinto (2009) find that subjects make 
skew seeking choices, especially when the upside gain is high. Similarly, Boyer, Mitton, 
and Vorkink (2010) and Conrad, Dittmar, and Ghysels (2009) find that investors are 
attracted to stocks with high expected skewness. Boyer and Vorkink (2011) show a 
similar preference in stock options. Most recently, Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) use 
the maximum daily return over a month  and document a significant negative relation 
                                                                                                                                            
overtrading may be relevant for asset pricing, but it seems dubious that it is a major importance for 
household finances".  
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between these extreme positive returns and expected stock returns (i.e. the monthly 
average returns in the subsequent month). They interpret this relation as evidence that 
investors are willing to pay more for stocks with lottery-like returns, which yield lower 
returns in the future. The evidence suggests that investors' preferences to high payoffs 
may play a significant role in determining asset returns.  
 However, despite the important implications of fund flows on asset prices and 
managerial incentives, we have limited understanding of how lottery-like returns affect 
product choices in the mutual fund market. First, investors may invest in mutual funds for 
liquidity and diversification reasons, which they may not able to accomplish by investing 
in individual stocks, or they may prefer mutual funds as a passive form of investing rather 
than a more active form of investing in stocks. Therefore, while investors may present a 
tendency to buy stocks with lottery-like returns when they invest in the stock market, it is 
not clear whether they will also present a similar behavior when they choose professional 
managers to invest their money. Second, even if some investors exhibit this behavior, it is 
an empirical question whether fund flows will be affected by these preferences. Third, 
other studies, infer investors' preferences from changes in prices. For example, Bali 
Cakici (2011) find that stocks with extreme daily returns in a month are related to 
negative expected returns which is one prediction of the theoretical models (Barberis and 
Huang (2008)). While the link between extreme daily returns and expected returns is the 
excess demand for the lottery-like stocks, they do not directly show this link, but infer 
investor’s preference from low future returns. On the other hand, fund flows measure the 
money in and out of the funds, which is determined by the investors’ choices, and hence 
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mutual funds provide a unique opportunity to observe investors' preferences via fund 
flows (Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005)). 
 My tests do not allow inferences about whether MAX-based fund selection 
strategies are optimal or not. If MAX is a predictor of risk-adjusted future performance, 
then selecting funds based on MAX may be simply an easy way for investors to select 
well-managed funds. But even if MAX-based fund investments underperform, their 
selection could be rational. For example, if lottery-like features enter investors’ utility 
functions, then choosing such funds may be optimal if MAX predicts future MAX. In 
other words, if lottery-like features are persistent and valuable to investors, then MAX-
based flows can be rational.  
 I find evidence that MAX-based fund selections underperform, but I also 
document that MAX is robustly persistent over time. Specifically, my analysis suggests 
that funds in the top decile with respect to MAX are in the top decile (in one of the top 
three deciles) in the subsequent month with a probability of 48% (79%). Multivariate 
fund-level cross-sectional regressions suggest that MAX demonstrates significant 
persistence with a positive coefficient of 0.612 after controlling for various fund 
characteristics including size, age, volatility, skewness, return, flow, expenses, and load 
fees. Regarding performance, I show that funds with a 1% higher level of MAX are 
associated with 10 bps lower future raw returns per month and 8 bps lower future risk 
adjusted returns per month. Thus, fund-selection strategies based on MAX are costly to 
investors in terms of expected returns.  
 There are a handful of papers that discuss whether investors are smart in their 
capital allocations among funds. Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) show that fund inflows 
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are associated with higher future performance and fund flows appear to be “smart 
money”. However, Frazzini and Lamont (2008) argue that this effect is, at best, confined 
to short horizons and investors make suboptimal decisions in the long run. This 
conclusion is reinforced by Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005), who show that loser funds 
attract inflows by simply changing their names to a hot style without actually changing 
their style. Moreover, Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004) find that, even in the simplest 
investment products such as index funds, naive rules in selecting funds (i.e. low expenses 
and higher past returns) outperform the returns that investors actually earn. This paper 
also contributes to this literature by showing that investors are successful in achieving 
lottery-like payoffs in the future, but this success comes at the cost of lower expected 
returns.  
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section II, I describe my 
sample and my main variable (MAX), and motivate the use of this variable as a proxy for 
lottery-like preferences. In section III, I analyze the effect of MAX on fund flows using 
portfolio analysis and multivariate regressions. Section IV interprets the results. Section 
V reports the results from robustness tests. Section VI offers concluding remarks. 
Data 
Sample 
 Daily and monthly fund returns, and other fund characteristics are obtained from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund 
Database. The sample covers domestic equity funds from October 1998, the first month 
CRSP starts reporting daily fund returns until December 2010. I select funds with the 
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following Lipper investment categories
7
: (i) Small-Cap Growth ('SCGE'), (ii) Small-Cap 
Core ('SCCE') (iii) Small-Cap Value ('SCVE'), (iv) Mid-Cap Growth ('MCGE'), (v) Mid-
Cap Core ('MCCE') (vi) Mid-Cap Value ('MCVE'), (vii) Multi-Cap Growth ('MLGE'), 
(viii) Multi-Cap Core ('MLCE'), (ix) Multi-Cap Value ('MLVE'), (x) Large-Cap Growth 
('LCGE'), (xi) Large-Cap Core ('LCCE'), (xii) Large-Cap Value ('LCVE'). This filter 
removes bond funds, balanced funds, international funds, and sector funds from the 
sample. To further remove index funds, I use the "index fund flag" field available in 
CRSP as well as fund names.
8
 In order to account for a potential incubation bias, I 
eliminate funds that are less than two years old and observations with a missing fund 
name in CRSP.
9
 From the remaining sample, I further exclude funds with zero expenses 
since observations with zero expenses are most likely to indicate missing information 
(Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005), and Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdύ (2009)). The final 
sample contains 719,538 fund-month observations from 11695 distinct funds and 12  
                                               
7 CRPS provides three different codes to identify fund investment styles: Wiesenberger codes, Strategic 
Insights (SI) codes, and Lipper codes. These codes cover three different time periods: The Weisenberger 
codes are available before 1992; the Strategic Insights codes are available between 1992 and 1998; and the 
Lipper codes exist after 1999. Since my sample starts from October 1998, I only use Lipper codes. For the 
remaining four months in 1998, I select the funds that are in my sample after 1999. If a Lipper code is 
missing in a particular year, but is available for that fund in a later or earlier year, then I keep that 
observation and fill the code with its earlier or later classification. Moreover, if a fund's Lipper code is not 
same in each year, then the fund is assigned to its most frequently classified category as in Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2002). 
 
8 A value "D" in the "index fund flag" indicates a pure index fund. However, this flag is available only after 
June 2008. Hence, I also make a name search to identify index funds. Following Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdύ 
(2009), I code a fund as an index fund if its name contains any of the following strings: "Index", "Idx", 
"Ix", "Indx", "NASDAQ", "Nasdaq", "Dow", "Mkt", "DJ", "S&P 500", "BARRA". 
 
9 Mutual fund incubation is a strategy in which fund families start multiple new funds and open some of 
them to the public at the end of an evaluation period, while the others are shut down before investors 
become aware of them. This strategy creates an upward bias in fund returns. Evans (2010) suggests that an 
age filter eliminates this bias. 
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investment styles as defined by Lipper investment categories.
10
 
Variable Definitions 
 I define the monthly net flow into a fund as:  
, , 1 ,
,
, 1
TNA TNA *(1 R )
Flow
TNA
i t i t i t
i t
i t


 
    (1.1) 
where 
,R i t  is the monthly return of fund   during month   and ,TNAi t  is the total net asset 
value of fund   at the end of month  . This definition reflects the growth rate of a fund 
due to new investments and assumes that all new investments occur at the end of the 
month. Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) show that the dates of fund mergers often differ 
from actual merger dates and this inaccuracy introduces a large number of errors in fund 
returns. Even though this bias in fund returns does not show a systematic pattern, it may 
lead to extreme values of flows. Therefore, following Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), I 
filter out the top and bottom 2.5% of tails of the flow data in order to mitigate the impact 
of potential outliers around mergers.
11
  
 The main variable of interest, MAXt , is defined as the style-adjusted maximum 
daily return within month t. Style-adjusted daily returns are calculated by subtracting the 
daily returns of a fund from the average daily returns of all funds with the same style 
(Teo and Woo (2001)). Since mutual funds are often confined to trading stocks within 
their style, returns of the funds within the same style have high cross-sectional 
correlations. Hence, funds with superior returns are more likely to belong to above-
                                               
10 I treat each share class as a distinct fund. For the purpose of the paper, it is important to conduct tests at 
the share class level because different share classes may cater to different investors (Nanda, Wang, and 
Zheng (2009)). In particular, funds may offer both institutional and retail classes. Investors in these classes 
behave differently regarding the lottery preferences (see section IV). Nevertheless, analysis at the fund 
level gives qualitatively similar results. 
 
11 Alternatively, I filter out the top and bottom of 1% tails of the flow data. Results are similar. 
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average performing styles. Style-adjusted returns control for the time-varying style effect, 
and mitigate the concern of categorizing funds as high MAX funds because of the 
popularity of the style they belong to.
12
 Moreover, given the frequent references to fund 
categories in media and other financial resources, it is mostly likely that individuals use 
style information in their investment decision in order to simply information processing 
(Mullainathan (2001)). Empirically, there is considerable evidence that investors make 
their decision based on fund and style returns (see Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Pomorski 
(2004)). Therefore, it is particularly important to adjust for style returns in order to 
differentiate style attraction from the effect that I want to capture. 
 MAX is a well-motivated measure from a theoretical perspective and it differs 
conceptually and empirically from other measures of return dispersion or asymmetry 
such as skewness or volatility. In Barberis and Huang (2008), positive extreme states are 
the mechanism through which investors maximize their value function, and consequently 
overvalue assets that provide these states. Similarly, in Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker 
(2007), the pricing effects are driven by extreme positive states not by skewness per se. 
Moreover, in both models, investors' attraction to assets comes from the anticipation of 
extreme payoffs in the future, requiring that a measure should be persistent to be used for 
both models' predictions. My tests show that MAX satisfies this criterion.
13
 MAX is 
                                               
12 I also use value-weighted and median returns in each style to make the adjustment (Gaspar, Massa, and 
Matos (2006), and Sialm and Tham (2011)). Results are similar and available upon request. I also use 
unadjusted MAX as a sorting variable. Even though high MAX funds predominantly belong to small-
growth funds, making harder to differentiate between MAX effect and style effect, I still observe that high 
MAX funds have higher flows than low MAX funds.  
 
13 In section IV A, I show that MAX in a given period strongly predicts MAX in the subsequent periods. 
However, among others, Singleton and Wingender (1986) show that skewness in a given time period may 
not be a good predictor of skewness in the subsequent period. This point is also valid for idiosyncratic 
skewness (Harvey and Siddique (2000), and Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010)). 
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based on the right tail of a return distribution and may better capture the notion that 
investors primarily judge on lottery-like return profile based on the tail events as opposed 
to the entire distribution used in skewness (Barberis and Huang (2008), Bali, Cakici, and 
Whitelaw (2011)).  
 From a practical standpoint, MAX is also a simple measure to understand and is 
easily accessible. Many financial sites (i.e. WSJ Fund Screener, Bloomberg U.S. Fund 
Rankings) report daily returns, the daily rankings of funds within each investment style as 
well as the historical highest and lowest daily prices and returns in a given month. 
Presumably, investors can grasp MAX more easily than other measures such as 
skewness, which requires a calculation of third moments and is generally not supplied in 
financial resources.  
 Size is defined as the total net assets (TNA) of a fund. Age is the number of years 
since the inception date of a fund.
14
 Expense ratio is the fund total operating expenses 
expressed as a percentage of the fund's average net assets. 12b-1 fees are fees paid out of 
fund assets to cover marketing, advertising, and distribution services. Non12b-1 fees are 
the expense ratio net of 12b-1 fees and are used to proxy non-marketing expenses.
15
 Front 
load (rear load) measured as a percentage of fund assets is the fee investors pay when 
they buy (redeem) fund shares. Return is the monthly fund return net of expenses. Four-
factor alpha is the intercept from the regression of monthly fund excess returns on 
                                                                                                                                            
 
14 I use "first_offer_date" as a proxy for the fund inception date. 
 
15 Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2005) show that flows seem to react differently to 12b-1 fees and Non12b-1 
fees. 12b-1 fees are mainly used for brokers' compensation or for advertising, both of which may increase 
the visibility of the funds. On the other hand, Non12b-1 fees cover portfolio management and 
administrative expenses payable to the fund's investment advisor as well as custodial, legal, and accounting 
expenses.
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Carhart's (1997) four factors in the preceding 60 months. Volatility of a fund in month t is 
the standard deviation of daily returns within month t, and skewness of a fund in month t 
is calculated from the daily returns over the previous 12 months. 
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics of my sample. For each key statistics, I first 
compute a cross-sectional mean in each month within each investment style, and then 
report the time series average of these cross-sectional means. In a given month the 
sample includes, on average, 4944 funds with average total net assets (TNA) of $490.42 
million. Large-cap core funds are the largest group with an average number of 744 funds, 
while mid-cap value is the smallest groups with an average number of 207 funds. On 
average, funds charge similar fees, even though non-marketing fees for small-cap funds 
are slightly higher. Growth oriented funds tend to have higher turnover, which indicates a 
shorter-term strategy to pursue supposedly superior returns. Their trading strategy also 
leads to more volatile returns for these funds. Small and mid-cap funds earn higher 
returns net of expenses (0.88% and 0.84% on average) than other funds. However, there 
is no discernible difference in the risk-adjusted returns (four factor alphas) among funds. 
Characteristics of MAX Sorted Portfolios   
 Funds that deliver MAX might have certain characteristics different from other 
funds. To get a picture of the composition of high MAX portfolios, each month I rank all 
funds into deciles on the basis of MAX and calculate the cross-sectional mean of fund 
characteristics including MAX, size, age, style-adjusted monthly returns, fund fees, 
turnover, volatility, and skewness. All variables are calculated as in Table 1.1. Panel A of 
Table 1.2 shows the time series averages of the cross-sectional means for these variables. 
In addition, Panel B Panel B shows the correlations among the same variables.
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Table 1.1. Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports the time-series averages of monthly cross-sectional mean values for various fund characteristics from 1998/9 to 2010/12. Mutual funds are divided in 
categories according to their Lipper classifications. N is the average number of funds within each category. Size is the total net assets of funds (TNA). Age is the number 
of years since the inception date. Expense ratio is total annual management and administrative expenses. 12b-1 fee is the marketing, advertising and distribution 
expenses, while Non12b-1 fee- measured as the difference between expense ratio and 12b-1 fee- is a proxy for non-marketing fees. Front (rear) load is the fee that 
investors pay when they buy (redeem) fund shares. Return is the monthly style-adjusted return while the four-factor alpha is the intercept from the regression of monthly 
fund excess returns on Carhart's (1997) four factors in the preceding 60 months. Flow is the percentage change in TNA adjusted for investment returns. Turnover is 
defined as the minimum of purchases and sales over average TNA. Volatility is the standard deviation of returns in a month and skewness is calculated using daily 
returns in each year. % of load funds is the number of funds that charge front and/or rear loads. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category N TNA Age 
Expense 
Ratio 
Non 
12b-1 12b-1 
Front 
Load 
Rear 
Load Return 
Four-
factor 
alpha MAX Flow Turnover Volatility Skewness 
LCCE 744 672.03 10.63 1.34% 0.97% 0.37% 0.99% 0.90% 0.36% -0.11% 0.52% 0.08% 82.76% 1.19% 2.56% 
LCGE 630 547.10 9.16 1.43% 1.04% 0.40% 0.93% 1.00% 0.39% -0.09% 0.64% 0.48% 96.60% 1.31% 5.38% 
LCVE 388 852.24 9.91 1.36% 0.94% 0.42% 1.08% 1.00% 0.46% -0.10% 0.50% 0.37% 65.64% 1.13% -0.56% 
MCCE 209 396.39 8.03 1.64% 1.29% 0.35% 0.95% 0.99% 0.86% 0.03% 0.82% 0.91% 106.26% 1.28% -7.86% 
MCGE 446 264.40 8.83 1.56% 1.16% 0.40% 0.97% 1.00% 0.80% -0.06% 0.85% 0.62% 132.28% 1.49% -4.25% 
MCVE 207 397.81 7.72 1.50% 1.13% 0.37% 0.98% 0.91% 0.86% 0.02% 0.72% 1.02% 87.54% 1.18% -9.15% 
MLCE 531 383.38 7.85 1.36% 1.00% 0.36% 0.91% 0.87% 0.53% -0.06% 0.75% 0.68% 84.54% 1.17% -3.20% 
MLGE 352 950.20 8.92 1.57% 1.15% 0.42% 1.02% 1.03% 0.58% -0.01% 0.97% 0.64% 126.93% 1.44% 0.09% 
MLVE 363 495.98 8.93 1.34% 0.97% 0.36% 0.92% 0.90% 0.54% -0.08% 0.67% 0.47% 69.96% 1.13% -3.78% 
SCCE 435 228.13 7.45 1.64% 1.32% 0.31% 0.77% 0.94% 0.90% -0.08% 0.78% 0.73% 92.69% 1.30% -7.53% 
SCGE 425 157.50 7.58 1.66% 1.30% 0.36% 0.88% 1.02% 0.85% -0.13% 0.87% 0.50% 133.82% 1.51% -7.42 % 
SCVE 214 178.27 7.32 1.59% 1.22% 0.37% 0.94% 1.00% 0.89% -0.11% 0.71% 0.66% 70.70% 1.24% -5.77% 
                
All funds 4944 490.42 8.76 1.47% 1.10% 0.38% 0.94% 0.96% 0.60% -0.07% 0.71% 0.52% 92.69% 1.28% -0.43% 
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Table 1.2. Characteristics of Funds Sorted by MAX 
Each month t from 1998/9 to 2010/12, funds are sorted into deciles based on MAX in month t. Decile 1(10) is the group of funds with the lowest (highest) MAX. For 
each decile. Panel A reports the time series averages of the cross-sectional mean values for various fund characteristics in the same month. Size is the total net assets of 
funds (TNA). Age is the number of years since the inception date. Expense ratio is total annual management and administrative expenses. 12b-1 fee is the marketing, 
advertising and distribution expenses, while Non12b-1 fee- measured as the difference between expense ratio and 12b-1 fee- is a proxy for non-marketing fees. Front 
(rear) load is the fee that investors pay when they buy (redeem) fund shares. Return is the monthly style-adjusted return. 12MRet is the cumulative twelve months returns 
Volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns in a month and skewness is calculated using daily returns over the previous 12 months. Panel B reports time series 
averages of cross-sectional correlation for the same fund characteristics. 
 
Panel A: Fund Characteristics 
 
  MAX Size Age Turnover 
Expense 
Ratio 
Front 
Load 
Rear 
Load 
12b-1 
Fee Flow Return 
FF4 
alpha 12MRet Volatility Min Skewness 
Low 
MAX  0.23% 766.15 8.99 82.44% 1.30% 0.93% 0.94% 0.60% 0.28% -0.03% -0.11% 3.37% 1.17% -0.37% -0.07% 
2 0.34% 584.09 9.06 83.48% 1.35% 0.97% 0.96% 0.61% 0.36% 0.12% -0.11% 4.42% 1.19% -0.45% -0.78% 
3 0.41% 540.86 8.98 86.00% 1.39% 0.96% 0.98% 0.60% 0.42% 0.26% -0.10% 4.95% 1.21% -0.50% -1.24% 
4 0.48% 487.31 8.83 88.65% 1.41% 0.97% 0.98% 0.60% 0.49% 0.37% -0.10% 5.54% 1.23% -0.55% -1.60% 
5 0.55% 491.70 8.77 91.19% 1.44% 0.97% 0.99% 0.61% 0.54% 0.49% -0.09% 5.89% 1.24% -0.60% -1.93% 
6 0.63% 458.33 8.74 93.16% 1.46% 0.97% 0.99% 0.61% 0.51% 0.59% -0.08% 6.09% 1.27% -0.65% -1.93% 
7 0.72% 443.53 8.65 95.77% 1.49% 0.96% 0.98% 0.60% 0.56% 0.69% -0.07% 6.35% 1.29% -0.72% -2.25% 
8 0.85% 422.70 8.58 99.86% 1.51% 0.95% 0.99% 0.60% 0.56% 0.85% -0.05% 6.96% 1.32% -0.80% -2.75% 
9 1.06% 410.30 8.45 105.61% 1.54% 0.93% 0.96% 0.59% 0.70% 1.13% -0.03% 7.79% 1.35% -0.93% -3.31% 
High 
MAX  1.84% 349.42 8.57 131.31% 1.83% 0.86% 0.87% 0.57% 0.86% 1.55% 0.00% 8.28% 1.57% -1.46% -2.70% 
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Table 1.2. (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Correlation among fund characteristics 
 
 
MAX Return 12Mret 
FF4 
alpha Size Age Turnover 
Exp. 
Ratio 12b-1 
Front 
Load 
Rear 
Load Volatility Skewness 
MAX 1             
Return 0.191 1            
12MRet 0.039 0.230 1           
FF4 alpha 0.035 0.035 0.311 1          
Size -0.030 0.007 0.019 0.065 1         
Age -0.011 0.000 -0.016 -0.035 0.311 1        
Turnover 0.144 -0.005 -0.025 -0.080 -0.064 -0.052 1       
Exp. Ratio 0.245 -0.060 -0.104 -0.181 -0.107 -0.057 0.108 1      
12b-1 -0.029 -0.019 -0.049 -0.105 -0.107 -0.179 0.003 0.671 1     
Front Load -0.014 0.000 -0.011 0.003 0.062 0.166 -0.014 -0.041 -0.528 1    
Rear Load -0.021 -0.016 -0.042 -0.078 -0.057 -0.076 -0.018 0.302 0.591 -0.206 1   
Volatility 0.449 -0.015 0.001 -0.076 -0.041 -0.032 0.197 0.167 -0.011 -0.015 -0.009 1 
 
Skewness -0.001 -0.001 -0.186 -0.039 0.006 0.021 -0.067 0.014 0.004 0.006 -0.002 0.005 1 
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 By construction, MAX increases from 0.23% in decile 1 (low MAX) to 1.84% in 
decile 10 (high MAX) indicating a sizeable variation in MAX across deciles. The mean 
style-adjusted return for high MAX (decile 10) funds is 1.55%, while it is -0.33% for low 
for low MAX (decile 1) funds. Similarly, past twelve month returns and four-factor alpha 
estimated from previous 60 months also greater in high MAX funds. The 
contemporaneous correlation between style-adjusted returns and MAX is 19%, while the 
correlation between twelve month returns and four-factor alpha is only around 4%. Total 
net assets of funds decrease as MAX increases across deciles. That is, high MAX 
portfolios are dominated by relatively smaller funds even though the absolute numbers 
are difficult to interpret due to growth of the mutual fund industry over time.
16
 High 
MAX funds tend to trade much more, and consequently charge higher operating fees 
compared to low MAX funds. Since volatility is calculated from daily returns in the same 
month, it is not surprising that high MAX funds have higher volatilities. The correlation 
between volatility and MAX is 45%.   
 Fund returns in my sample are negatively skewed on average and skewness of all 
MAX is also negative. When skewness is measured over the previous 12 months as in 
Table 1.2, high MAX funds are more negatively skewed than low MAX portfolios and 
consistently, skewness of all MAX portfolios is negative and are more negative for high 
MAX portfolios. However, when skewness is measured over shorter horizons, then high 
MAX portfolios become more positively skewed. For instance, when skewness is 
calculated using daily returns in the same month when MAX is measured, then high 
                                               
16 I replicate the single sort analysis in Table 1.2 by excluding the funds in the lowest quintile according to 
size. The results get even stronger after this filter. Moreover, I construct double sorted portfolios on MAX 
and size. The results are documented in Table 1.5 and show that the effect of MAX is stronger in bigger 
funds.  
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MAX portfolios have an average skewness of 5.01%, while low MAX portfolios have an 
average skewness of -0.97%. Moreover, interestingly, there is no significant correlation 
between skewness and MAX, suggesting that MAX is hardly a proxy for skewness, or 
vice versa.  
Flow-MAX Relation 
Portfolio Analysis: Univariate and Bivariate Sorts 
In this section, I use both univariate and bivariate (sequential) sorts to investigate 
the effect of MAX on future fund flows. In univariate sorts, I construct portfolios based 
on MAX and analyze future flows. In bivariate sorts, I examine the relation between 
MAX and future flows after controlling fund characteristics including style-adjusted 
returns, size, expense ratio, turnover, volatility, and skewness.  
 I begin the analysis with univariate sorts. Each month t, I rank all funds according 
to the style-adjusted maximum daily return (MAXt) within month t and assign them into 
deciles. These decile portfolios are held for a month after the portfolio formation. High 
MAX (decile 10) represents highest MAX decile whereas low MAX (decile 1) represents 
lowest MAX decile. Table 1.3 reports equally weighted monthly portfolio flows (Flowt+1) 
for each decile in month t+1. 
 According to the results, the average flow difference between high MAX and low 
MAX decile is 0.84% per month with a corresponding Newey and West (1987) t- 
statistics of 4.83.
 17
 The average dollar value of this flow difference (measured as the flow 
difference times the average size) is around $49 million per year. This difference is also 
                                               
17 I also calculate TNA-weighted flows. The difference in flows between high MAX and low MAX is 
0.81% and is statistically and economically significant. 
  
 
23 
 
economically significant especially given the evidence of a competitive market for 
mutual funds after 1998 (Wahal and Wang (2011)). 
 
Table 1.3. Average Monthly Flow of Funds Sorted by MAX(N) 
 
Each month t from 1998/9 to 2010/12, funds are sorted into deciles based on the average of N (N=1, 2, 3, 4, 5) highest 
daily style-adjusted returns (MAX (N)) in month t. These decile portfolios are held for a month after portfolio 
formation. This table reports equally weighted monthly portfolio flows for each decile in month t+1. Decile 1(10) is the 
group of funds with the lowest (highest) maximum multi-day returns. Flow is the growth rate of assets under 
management due to new investments. The last row (HM-LM) presents the difference of flow ratios between the High 
MAX (decile 10) and Low MAX (decile 1) groups. Newey and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics (up to 6 lags) are 
reported in parenthesis. All values except the t-statistics are given in percentage terms 
 
Deciles MAX MAX (2) MAX (3) MAX (4) MAX (5) 
Low MAX 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 
2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 
3 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.34 
4 0.51 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.47 
5 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.48 
6 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.62 
7 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.59 
8 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.67 0.69 
9 0.79 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 
High MAX 1.13 1.20 1.23 1.25 1.27 
HM-LM 0.84 0.92 0.96 0.99 1.01 
  (4.83) (5.05) (5.25) (5.21) (5.19) 
 
 
 Conditioning on a single day in defining MAX is a simple and intuitive way to 
proxy extreme positive returns. However, in order to ensure the robustness of the results, 
I also use alternative definitions of MAX. First, I rank all funds into deciles by the 
average of two, three, four, and five highest style-adjusted returns (MAX [N]t , N=2, 3, 4, 
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5) within month t. Again, decile portfolios are held for a month and the average flows in 
month t+1 (Flowt+1) for each portfolio are calculated. The results are presented in 
columns 2 to 5 of Table 1.4. I observe a similar pattern in future flows when I use these 
alternative definitions of MAX. In all cases, the flow difference between high MAX [N] 
(decile 10) and low MAX [N] (decile 1) portfolios is significant at 1% level, and in fact 
increases as I average over more days.  
 Second, I use longer horizons to calculate MAX. Specifically, each month t, I 
calculate the single style-adjusted maximum daily return  as well as the average of two, 
three, four, and five highest style adjusted returns (MAX[N]t,k, N=1,2,3,4,5, K=3,6,12)  
over the previous three, six, and twelve months. I rank funds into deciles according to 
these alternative definitions of MAX. Again, decile portfolios are held for a month and 
the average flows in month t+1 (Flowt+1) for each portfolio are calculated. The results are 
presented in Panel A, B, C of Table 1.4. For all horizons, the flow difference between 
highest and lowest MAX[N]k deciles ranges between 0.66% and 0.73% per months and is 
highly statistically significant. Results get even stronger as I average over more days over 
the past three, six, and twelve months. Thus, not only the very recent extreme returns but 
also extreme returns observed over a longer period may affect investors' decisions. As a 
final check, I use the average of MAX (i.e. maximum style-adjusted daily return in a 
month) over the previous two, three, six, twelve, and eighteen months (AMAXN N=2, 3, 
6, 12, 18). Panel D of Table 1.4  reports the average flows in month t+1 of decile 
portfolios sorted on these measures. The difference in average flows between the highest 
and lowest AMAX2 (the average of MAX over two months) is 0.87% and increase 
monotonically to 1.02% for AMAX18 (the average of MAX over eighteen months). This  
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 Table 1.4. Average Monthly Flow of Funds Sorted by MAX(N)K 
 
Each month t from 1998/9 to 2010/12, funds are sorted into deciles based on the average of N (N=1, 2, 3, 4, 5) highest daily style-adjusted returns (MAX (N)K) over the 
previous K months where K=3,6,12 months. These decile portfolios are held for a month after portfolio formation. This table reports equally weighted monthly portfolio 
flows for each decile in month t+1.Decile 1(10) is the group of funds with the lowest (highest) maximum multi-day returns. Flow is the growth rate of assets under 
management due to new investments The last row (HM-LM) presents the difference of flow ratios between the High MAX (decile 10) and Low MAX (decile 1) groups. 
Newey and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics (up to 6 lags) are reported in parenthesis. All values except the t-statistics are given in percentage terms. Panel A reports 
flows for decile portfolios calculated based on MAX measured over the previous 3 months. Panel B reports flows for decile portfolios sorted on MAX measured over the 
previous 6 months, and Panel C reports flows for decile portfolio sorted on MAX measured over the previous 12 months. Panel D presents flows for decile portfolios 
sorted on the average of single day MAX over the previous 2 ,3, 6, 12, and 18 months.  
 
Panel A: MAX calculated over the previous 3 months                                           Panel B: MAX calculated over the previous 6 months                          
 
 
Panel C: MAX calculated over the previous 12 months                                                       Panel D: Average of MAX over the previous 2, 3, 6, 12, 18 months     
 
Decile Max[1]3 Max[2]3 Max[3]3 Max(4)3 Max(5)3 
Low MAX 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.27 
2 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.32 
3 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 
4 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.51 
5 0.51 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.54 
6 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.52 
7 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 
8 0.70 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.67 
9 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.83 0.84 
High MAX 1.05 1.13 1.14 1.17 1.18 
HM-LM 0.73 0.85 0.85 0.89 0.91 
 
(4.25) (4.63) (4.38) (4.59) (4.65) 
Decile Max[1]6 Max[2]6 Max[3]6 Max[4]6 Max[5]6 
Low MAX 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 
2 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.29 
3 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.46 
4 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.53 
5 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.51 0.50 
6 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.57 
7 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.59 
8 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.72 
9 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.85 
High MAX 1.01 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.13 
HM-LM 0.72 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.86 
 
(4.26) (4.16) (4.07) (5.45) (5.54) 
Decile Max[1]12 Max[2]12 Max[3]12 Max[4]12 Max[5]12 
 Low MAX 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 
2 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.25 
3 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 
4 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.54 
5 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.54 
6 0.59 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.55 
7 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.62 
8 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.66 
9 0.77 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.88 
High MAX 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.95 
HM-LM 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.73 0.72 
  (5.11) (4.78) (4.95) (5.08) (4.96) 
Decile AMax2 AMax3 AMax6 AMax12 AMax18 
Low MAX 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.13 
2 0.37 0.36 0.30 0.25 0.29 
3 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.46 
4 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.47 
5 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.42 
6 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.59 
7 0.59 0.56 0.61 0.64 0.68 
8 0.66 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.69 
9 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.87 0.81 
High MAX 1.16 1.18 1.22 1.18 1.15 
HM-LM 0.87 0.92 0.96 0.97 1.02 
  (4.68) (4.74) (4.54) (4.24) (4.67) 
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suggests that investors are increasingly attracted to funds if they have high MAX on 
average over past periods. Overall, using different horizons and the number of days to 
proxy extreme returns produce similar results. In the rest of the paper I focus on MAX- 
single day maximum return over a month- , but the results are very similar if I use one of 
these alternative definitions. 
In univariate sorts, I show that there is a positive relationship between flows and 
MAX. However, as presented in the previous section, fund characteristics such as style-
adjusted returns, size, expenses, turnover, volatility, and skewness vary across MAX 
portfolios. These variables might also influence flows. To determine whether the positive 
relation between flows and MAX holds after controlling these fund characteristics, I 
conduct bivariate (sequential) sorts. These sorts also give insights about how the flow-
MAX relation changes across different types of funds. Specifically, in each month, I first 
rank all funds in ascending order according to different fund characteristics and allocate 
them into three groups- Bottom, Mid, Top-based upon a 20:60:20 split. Then within each 
group, I further sort the funds into deciles based on MAX within the same month. This 
creates 30 portfolios, which are held for a month after portfolio formation. I alternatively 
form 25 portfolios by 5x5 sequential (dependent) sorts as well as 100 portfolios by 10x10 
sequential sorts. The results are similar and do not change any inference. Moreover, 
instead of sequential sorts, I also construct portfolios using independent sorts. The results 
are again similar to those in sequential sorts and available upon request. Table 1.5 reports 
average flows in the subsequent month for the 30 portfolios based on the 20:60:20 
approach along with the flow difference between high MAX (decile 10) and low MAX 
(decile 1) portfolios.  
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 The results in Table 1.5 suggest that the flow-MAX relation is present in all return 
controlled groups. However, the effect is much stronger for winners than for losers. 
Among losers, the flow difference between high MAX (decile 10) and low MAX (decile 
1) portfolio is 0.37% per month (t-statistics: 2.04), which is half of the unconditional 
effect of MAX (0.84%) reported in Table 1.3. Among winners, the flow difference is 
much greater with a value of 0.80% per month and is highly statistically significant. 
Table 1.5 documents that high MAX funds are more likely to have higher returns in the 
same month (1.55% vs.-0.03%). If investors form expectations about future high payoff 
states based on previous MAX, then the strong effect among winners makes sense since 
high MAX funds are dominated by winners. The results also suggest that the flow-MAX 
relation is stronger among relatively bigger funds, funds with higher expense ratios, 
turnover, and volatility, younger funds, and funds with lower skewness. 
Multivariate Regressions 
In this section, I adopt a regression approach based on Fama and MacBeth (1973), 
which controls for multiple fund characteristics simultaneously. Specifically, I run the 
following regression: 
i,t+1 i,t i,t i,t i,t i,tFlow =α +β MAX + δ X + ε     (1.2) 
where 
i,t+1Flow  is the flow ratio for fund i in month t+1 and i,tX  is a vector of control 
variables for fund i in month t. The control variables are the logarithm of fund size, the 
logarithm of fund age, Non12b-1 fees, 12b-1 fees, turnover, front load, rear load, fund 
flows, and past performance. Among others, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac (2008), and Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) show 
that these variables influence future fund flows. 
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Table 1.5. Average Monthly Flow of Funds Sorted on MAX and Fund Characteristics 
 
Each month t from 1998/9 to 2010/12, funds are ranked in ascending order according to different fund characteristics in month t and are allocated into three groups. 
Bottom, Mid, Top-based upon a 20:60:20 split. Bottom (Top) refers to the group of funds that are in the bottom (top) 20% of all funds ranked according to the fund 
characteristic. Mid includes funds that are in the 2nd-4th quintiles according to the fund characteristics. Then within each group, I further sort the funds into deciles based 
on MAX within the same month. This creates 30 portfolios which are held for a month after portfolio formation. This table reports equally weighted monthly portfolio 
flows for each decile in month t+1. Decile 1(10) is the group of funds with the lowest (highest) MAX. Flow is the growth rate of assets under management due to new 
investments.. The last row (HM-LM) presents the difference of flow ratios between the High Max (decile 10) and Low Max (decile 1) groups. Newey and West (1987) 
adjusted t-statistics (up to 6 lags) are reported in parenthesis. All values except the t-statistics are given in percentage terms. 
 
 
Return Size Age Turnover 
 Bottom Mid Top Bottom Mid Top Bottom Mid Top Bottom Mid Top 
Low MAX 0.16 0.34 0.87 1.30  0.13  -0.14 1.58 0.19 -0.77 0.45 0.14 0.74 
2 0.11 0.39 1.10 1.52  0.21  -0.14 1.82 0.33 -0.75 0.48 0.26 0.73 
3 0.27 0.46 1.00 1.40  0.25  -0.06 1.86 0.32 -0.70 0.51 0.33 0.73 
4 0.20 0.43 1.07 1.56  0.29  0.04  1.93 0.45 -0.69 0.56 0.40 0.74 
5 0.24 0.50 1.11 1.65  0.37  0.08  1.99 0.43 -0.55 0.60 0.45 0.67 
6 0.29 0.55 1.10 1.65  0.37  0.15  2.00 0.48 -0.59 0.68 0.49 0.80 
7 0.23 0.51 1.35 1.52  0.44  0.21  2.09 0.52 -0.50 0.79 0.50 0.90 
8 0.15 0.58 1.43 1.66  0.47  0.23  2.05 0.54 -0.50 0.77 0.52 0.84 
9 0.24 0.54 1.49 1.58  0.64  0.33  2.34 0.65 -0.33 0.93 0.64 0.97 
High MAX 0.53 0.69 1.66 1.75  1.02  0.65  2.80 0.91 -0.03 0.93 0.84 1.84 
 
0.37 0.35 0.80 0.45 0.88 0.79 1.22 0.72 0.74 0.47 0.70 1.11 
 
(2.04) (2.86) (4.99) (2.16) (4.72) (6.48) (5.28) (5.15) (7.81) (3.01) (4.17) (3.57) 
 
 
Expense Ratio 12b-1 Volatility Skewness 
 Bottom Mid Top Bottom Mid Top Bottom Mid Top Bottom Mid Top 
Low MAX 0.55 0.23 -0.10 0.65 0.38 -0.35 0.55 0.25 0.31 0.81 0.30 0.06 
2 0.61 0.39 -0.12 0.76 0.48 -0.20 0.53 0.30 0.40 0.96 0.36 0.09 
3 0.73 0.47 -0.14 0.65 0.54 -0.16 0.58 0.43 0.44 0.98 0.36 0.01 
4 0.67 0.60 0.00 0.75 0.67 -0.13 0.74 0.40 0.48 1.05 0.42 0.05 
5 0.73 0.65 0.02 0.75 0.66 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.62 1.01 0.51 0.16 
6 0.82 0.70 0.04 0.76 0.71 0.07 0.90 0.50 0.64 1.07 0.55 0.14 
7 0.74 0.78 0.10 0.86 0.76 0.05 0.79 0.52 0.73 1.22 0.55 0.21 
8 0.81 0.76 0.18 0.79 0.79 0.05 0.89 0.61 0.78 1.35 0.60 0.25 
9 0.80 0.99 0.39 0.86 0.97 0.12 0.87 0.67 0.98 1.45 0.64 0.40 
High MAX 1.06 1.27 0.82 1.06 1.32 0.50 1.04 0.84 1.52 1.74 0.96 0.63 
 
0.51 1.04 0.92 0.41 0.94 0.84 0.49 0.59 1.21 0.93 0.66 0.57 
 
(3.42) (6.75) (3.84) (2.63) (5.90) (3.43) (4.55) (4.91) (4.77) (4.73) (4.69) (2.80) 
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MAX may increase the visibility of a fund and this visibility may attract 
investors’ attention. Even though I do not completely rule out this explanation, I use three 
additional control variables including family size, large family dummy, and star fund 
dummy, which are arguably better proxies for visibility in the mutual fund industry.
18
 
Most funds belong to families.
19
Because of brand-building and marketing benefits; 
belonging to a large family increases the promotion and visibility of a fund, which may 
attract investors. Therefore, I use log of family size and a dummy variable that equals to 
one if a fund is a member of a large family.
20
 Moreover, funds with stellar performance 
receive media attention and attract investors (Nanda, Vikram and Zheng (2004), Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2008)). To control for this “star” effect, I rank funds each month 
according Carhart’s (1997) alphas over the previous 60 months. Funds in the top 5% are 
defined as star funds.
21
 All specifications include style-dummies (based on 12 Lipper 
classifications) to control for the style fixed effects and to allow for changing investor 
tastes for funds with different investment styles (Bergstresser and Poterba (2002)).  
While MAX is arguably a theoretically motivated measure, there is still a concern 
that it might proxy for volatility. In particular, volatile funds are more likely to exhibit 
extreme returns as suggested by the high positive correlation between two variables. 
Equally important is to examine the ability of MAX to explain flows after controlling for 
                                               
18 Fund size and 12b-1 expenses (i.e. marketing, advertising, and brokerage costs) are other control 
variables, which are related to visibility of a fund. Sirri and Tufano (1998) find that media coverage, hence 
visibility, increases with fund size and volatility of returns. 
 
19 In my sample, 88% of funds are affiliated with a fund complex. 
 
20 For each month, a large family is defined as the family with total net assets in the top 10th percentile. 
Other cut-off points such as the top 5th or 1th percentile produce similar results. 
 
21 Using Carhart’s (1997) alphas over the previous 60, 36 and 24 produce similar results. I also rank funds 
within each style based on returns over the previous 12 months. Results are again similar. 
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skewness. Thus, I use volatility and skewness to control whether MAX is a proxy for 
these variables.
22
 I adjust Fama and MacBeth's (1973) t-statistics for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation up to 6 lags.
23
 
The extant literature (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998)) 
documents convexity in the relation between fund flows and past performance. To 
capture this feature, I adopt two different methods. The first one is outlined in Sirri and 
Tufano (1998). Specifically, each month I rank all funds according to their one month 
returns within each investment style and assign them fractional ranks uniformly 
distributed between 0 (worst performance) and 1 (best performance). These ranks 
represent a fund's percentile performance relative to other funds in that month. I then 
partition relative performance into three groups: 
, ,
, , ,
, , , ,
Low Min(Rank ,0.2)
Mid Min(Rank Low ,0.6)
High Rank Mid Low
i t i t
i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t

 
  
    (1.3) 
                                               
22 In Table 1.6, volatility is calculated using daily returns over a month, while daily returns over the 
previous 12 months are used for skewness. However, the results are similar if volatility is measured using 
daily returns over the previous 3, 6 or 12 months, or if skewness is measured over the previous 1, 3 or 6 
months. Moreover, in section V, I investigate the relation between MAX and idiosyncratic volatility and 
idiosyncratic skewness. The effect of MAX on flows is robust to control for idiosyncratic volatility and 
skewness.  
 
23 To validate the selection of 6 lags, I use the Pontiff (1996) method to test the Fama–MacBeth standard 
errors for potential higher-order serial correlation. Specifically, I estimate an autoregressive model using 
the time series of MAX coefficient estimates. The order of the autoregressive model is chosen such that its 
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is close to two. The DW statistics for autoregressive models of AR(1) to 
AR(5) range from 1.96 to 1.98 suggesting a slight positive autocorrelation.  I find that six lags are sufficient 
to eliminate the serial correlation in errors (DW = 2.0006). Pontiff (1996) use the standard errors of the 
intercept in autoregressive models as the autocorrelation corrected standard errors of the coefficient 
estimates. Using Newey and West’s (1987) correction of 6 lags, I find more conservative standard errors. 
Moreover, although I correct standard errors for potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, I also use 
a panel regression with standard errors clustered by both month and fund (Peterson (2009)). Results are in 
Table 1.17 , and are qualitatively similar to the results obtained from Fama-Macbeth regressions. 
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These three groups are added into the regression as control variables. In the second 
method, I directly use style-adjusted returns and the squared value of these returns in the 
regressions to capture the nonlinearities in the flow-performance relation. The first 
specification relies on the normalized performance, the second one uses absolute 
performance.  
The results are presented in Table 1.6.
24
 When the normalized performance is 
used (column-I), the coefficient of MAX is 0.146 and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. According to Table 1.3 , the average of MAX for funds in the top decile is 1.84%, 
while it is 0.23% for funds in the bottom decile. Multiplying the spread between these 
two deciles by the coefficient yields an estimate of additional flows of 2.82% per year, 
which is 13.2% of the average annual flows (21.3% per year).
 25
 Controlling for both 
volatility and skewness (column-VII), the effect of MAX further increases to 0.239, 
which translates an incremental gain of 4.62% in flows per year, which is 21.7% of the 
average annual flows.
 26
  When the absolute performance is used, the coefficients of 
MAX range between 0.110 and 0.195, and are all highly significant.
 27
 On the other hand, 
volatility loads negatively and has a significant coefficient, which is consistent with 
Huang, Wei, and Yang (2007). Similarly, skewness is also negatively related to future   
                                               
24 I multiply the coefficient of size, family size, and turnover by 100. 
 
25 To put it into context, moving 5th percentile in the highest performance category (for example from the 
85th to the 90th percentile) increases the flow by 2.1% per year.  
 
26 Instead of partitioning the fractional ranks into three groups- Low, Mid, High- I divide them into ten 
deciles perform the same tests by using 10 deciles in order to assess the robustness of the results to high 
percentiles (i.e. funds in the top 10%).  The coefficient of MAX is 0.136 with a standard error of 0.026.  
When both volatility and skewness are included into the regressions, the coefficient of MAX increases to 
0.228 with a standard error of 0.037.   
 
27 I also use an interaction term of volatility and skewness, with the idea that not skewness per se but 
skewness with high volatility may better reflect lottery-like preferences (Kumar (2009)). The coefficient of 
MAX remains highly significant, while the interaction term is not significant.  
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Table 1.6. Flow-MAX Relation 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions for funds from 1998/10 to 
2010/12. The dependent variable is the flow ratio. The independent variables are MAX over the previous month and a 
set of control variables including volatility and skewness of fund returns, flows, the logarithm of size, the logarithm of 
age, the logarithm of family size, 12b-1 fees, Non12b-1 fees (as measured by the difference between expense ratios and 
12b-1 fees), rear loads, front load, turnover, star-fund dummy, big-family dummy, and fund performance. All control 
variables are lagged at least one month and all specifications include style-dummies. Standard errors (in parenthesis) 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 6 lags) using Newey and West (1987). 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MAX 0.146*** 0.110*** 0.230*** 0.187*** 0.156*** 0.119*** 0.239*** 0.195*** 
 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.041) (0.042) (0.026) (0.028) (0.039) (0.040) 
         Volatility 
  
-0.573*** -0.606*** 
  
-0.586*** -0.627*** 
   
(0.167) (0.170) 
  
(0.158) (0.160) 
         Skewness 
    
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
     
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         Flow 0.347*** 0.347*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 0.346*** 0.346*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
         Log(Size) -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.111*** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
         Log(Fsize) 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
         Big Family 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         Star Fund 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         Log(Age) -0.580*** -0.579*** -0.580*** -0.579*** -0.585*** -0.584*** -0.585*** -0.584*** 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
         Non12b-1 -0.413*** -0.409*** -0.407*** -0.400*** -0.415*** -0.409*** -0.408*** -0.400*** 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) 
         12b-1 -0.705*** -0.708*** -0.706*** -0.708*** -0.732*** -0.734*** -0.733*** -0.735*** 
 
(0.104) (0.103) (0.106) (0.106) (0.101) (0.101) (0.104) (0.103) 
         Rear Load -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.141*** -0.141*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
         Front Load -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
         Turnover -0.030 -0.035* -0.024 -0.028 -0.035* -0.040** -0.026 -0.031* 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
         Low 0.012*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.012*** 
 
0.015*** 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
         Mid 0.004*** 
 
0.005*** 
 
0.005*** 
 
0.005*** 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
         High 0.032*** 
 
0.035*** 
 
0.032*** 
 
0.035*** 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
         Perf 
 
0.167*** 
 
0.188*** 
 
0.170*** 
 
0.190*** 
  
(0.017) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.015) 
         (Perf)2 
 
1.369*** 
 
1.437*** 
 
1.376*** 
 
1.475*** 
  
(0.301) 
 
(0.323) 
 
(0.295) 
 
(0.319) 
N 626623 626623 626620 626620 618708 618708 618705 618705 
R-sq 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
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fund flows. Overall, these results suggest that the effect of MAX is not only robust to 
controls for volatility and skewness, but is also the opposite of volatility and skewness 
effects. 
In general, the coefficients on the control variables are consistent with previous 
research. For instance, as documented in Sirri and Tufano (1998), the flow-performance 
relation is convex no matter whether the performance is normalized or not. Size and age 
negatively affect performance (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Huang, Wei, and Yan 
(2007)). Consistent with Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004), star performance results in 
greater inflows. Family size and belonging to a large family positively affect flows, 
presumably due to a branding and visibility effect. For the period 1993-1999, Barber, 
Odean, and Zheng (2005) show a positive relation between 12b-1 fees and flows, and 
interpret this evidence as the role of advertising in garnering new money from investors. 
Instead, I document a negative relation 12b-1 fees and flows as in Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-
Verdύ (2009). One possible explanation for the discrepancy in those results is that the 
increasingly easy access to financial information and the decreasing participation and 
search costs over time might mitigate the effect of advertising and distribution services 
on flows. 
If investors prefer high MAX funds due to their lottery like preferences and 
immediately invest in these funds after observing it, then the timing of the MAX in a 
given month might be important in determining the flow amount next month. For 
instance, funds which experience MAX over the early days of a month would have part 
of their inflows over the same month MAX measured, whereas funds which experience 
MAX in the later days of a month experience majority of the flows over the next month. 
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Since I measure flow using monthly data, then months which experience MAX in the 
later days of a month should have more inflows. To examine this possibility, I create a 
dummy variable (MAXTIME), which is equal to 1 if MAX occurs in the second half of 
the month (i.e. week 3 or 4) or 0 otherwise. I included the interaction term of MAX and 
MAXTIME in Fama and Macbeth’s (1973) regressions will full set of control variables. 
The interaction term of MAX and MAXTIME is significant with a value of 0.114, while 
the coefficient of MAX drops to 0.099 but remains significant. This suggests that when 
MAX occurs in the later days of a month, fund experience more inflow next month as 
majority of the flows will be captured by the next month flow, which is in line with the 
arguments above.
 28
 
There is considerable skewness in fund size. As reported in Table 1.1, average 
total net assets (TNA) of $490.42 million, while the corresponding median value is 52.79 
million. Clifford and Jordan (2011) argue that due to the skewness in fund size, what is 
true for an average fund may not true for an average fund investor. For instance, Gruber 
(1996) shows that investors buy funds that subsequently outperform, while selling funds 
that subsequently underperform. Hence, investors appear to be “smart” in their fund 
choices.
 29
 Clifford and Jordan (2011) document that the smart money effect is confined 
to only small funds (i.e. funds with size below median of the distribution) that have 
limited economic importance, and does not exist in big funds, which an average fund 
                                               
28 Carhart, Kaniel, Musto, and Reed (2002) find that fund managers aggressively buy the stocks they 
already have at the end of the quarter to push up stock prices in order to have high NAVs at period ends 
and increase their flows. MAX in returns may be produced through this process as managers’ actions will 
push the stock prices up. However, the effect of MAX in my sample does not change when I eliminate the 
quarter end months from my sample. 
 
29 Even though Sapp and Tiwari (2004) argue that this effect is due to momentum, Keswani and Stolin 
(2008) find evidence of “smartness” when studying the flows of both US and UK investors.  
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investor holds.
30
 Hence, a result that is significant for funds collectively may lack 
economic significance for fund investors unless the effect is observed in bigger funds as 
well. To investigate whether the effect of MAX is solely driven by small funds, for each 
month I create a dummy variable (Medsize), which takes the value of 1 if the fund has 
total net assets greater than the median size of all funds, or 0 otherwise. I use the 
interaction of this variable with MAX and dummy variable in my regressions. Other 
control variables are same as in Table 1.6. Panel A of Table 1.7 presents the results. 
 For brevity, I omit the coefficients of control variables except volatility and 
skewness. The interaction terms in all specifications are positive, albeit not statistically 
significant, ranging from 0.008 to 0.028. Next, I estimate two separate regressions (i.e. 
within above-median and below-median groups), thereby allowing all the coefficients to 
vary. In all specifications (Panel B of Table 1.7), the coefficients of MAX in the above-
median group are highly statistically significant and greater than the ones in the below-
median group. The coefficients of MAX in the below-median group are also significant 
in all but one specification.
 31
 The standard deviation of MAX is 1.16% in the above-
median groups, while it is 0.7% in the below-median group. This suggests that the 
economic impact of MAX is actually greater than what is reported in Table 1.6. Overall,  
                                               
30 The authors also investigate the convexity in flow-performance relation and the negative relation 
between fund performance and expense ratio documented by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdύ (2009). As in smart 
money effect, the convexity in flow-performance relation and the relation between fund performance and 
expense ratio  
 
31 One point of concern is that the survivor bias still exists in the CRSP data (Elton, Gruber, and Blake 
(2001)). While this bias particularly affects the absolute level of fund performance but it is not likely to bias 
the estimated coefficients that measure the sensitivity of flows to MAX. If MAX funds pursue risky 
strategies and die going forward, this would probably make it harder to find a negative relation between 
performance and MAX.  Moreover, my results show that the effect of MAX is not confined to small funds 
which are more prone to pursue risky strategies. Contrary, the effect of MAX is more prevalent in bigger 
funds where average investors are concentrated in (Clifford and Jordan (2011)) and which are less likely to 
die. 
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Table 1.7. Flow-MAX Relation within Different Size Groups 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly observations for 
funds from 1998/10 to 2010/12. The dependent variable is the flow ratio. In Panel A, Medsize is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the fund has total net assets greater than the median size of all funds, zero otherwise. Panel B 
presents the results of separate regression for the above and below median groups. Other control variables (omitted) are 
same as in Table 1.6. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 6 
lags) using Newey and West (1987). 
 
Panel A: Full sample regressions with the interaction term 
 
 
Piecewise Linear Regression Quadratic Regression 
MAX 0.139*** 0.227*** 0.147*** 0.236*** 0.098** 0.180*** 0.108*** 0.187*** 
 
(0.038) (0.042) (0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.042) (0.037) (0.040) 
         MAX*Medsize 0.016 0.008 0.021 0.014 0.027 0.019 0.028 0.022 
 
(0.064) (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.064) 
         Volatility 
 
-0.578*** 
 
-0.592*** 
 
-0.614*** 
 
-0.635*** 
  
(0.165) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.158) 
   
-0.004*** -0.003*** 
  
-0.004*** -0.003*** 
Skewness 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
Panel B: Separate regressions within above-median and below-median groups 
 
Above Median 
 
Piecewise Linear Regression Quadratic Regression 
MAX 0.161*** 0.227*** 0.176*** 0.241*** 0.119*** 0.178*** 0.133*** 0.191*** 
 
(0.044) (0.056) (0.043) (0.053) (0.042) (0.052) (0.041) (0.050) 
         Volatility 
 
-0.500*** 
 
-0.513*** 
 
-0.506*** 
 
-0.520*** 
  
(0.143) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.135) 
         Skewness 
  
-0.005*** -0.004*** 
  
-0.005*** -0.004*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
Below Median 
 
Piecewise Linear Regression Quadratic Regression 
MAX 0.097** 0.180*** 0.107** 0.188*** 0.062 0.141*** 0.070* 0.147*** 
 
(0.044) (0.048) (0.043) (0.047) (0.041) (0.050) (0.039) (0.047) 
         Volaility 
 
-0.525*** 
 
-0.549*** 
 
-0.604*** 
 
-0.637*** 
  
(0.187) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.182) 
         Skewness 
  
-0.004*** -0.003** 
  
-0.004*** -0.003** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
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my analysis suggests that the effect of MAX is not confined to small funds.  Indeed, if   
anything, it is stronger in bigger funds.  
 The findings of Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) might raise the concern that 
fund investors are attracted to underlying stocks’ MAX rather than the funds’ MAX 
itself. I argue that this is a remote possibility. First, investors do not observe the 
underlying individual stocks of mutual funds on daily or monthly basis like fund returns. 
Second, fund returns are not exactly driven only by common stocks in the fund portfolio. 
These returns are net of expenses and reflect the valuation of overall fund portfolio which 
may include bonds, cash, and other instruments. Third, investors may be attracted to 
funds based on stocks’ MAX if stock attributes relating to MAX automatically translate 
into the same portfolio attributes when these stocks are put into a fund.  
However, the existing literature already documents that individual stock 
characteristics may not translate into portfolio characteristics. For example while the 
aggregate market returns are negatively skewed, individual stock returns exhibit positive 
skewness (Hong and Stein (2003), Duffee (1995)). The disconnection between skewness 
of individual stocks and portfolio skewness is due to the comovement in one stock’s 
return with the remaining stocks in the portfolio. As shown in Albuquerque (2012), in a 
portfolio, the comovement term dominates the weighted average of individual stock 
skewness as the number of stocks in the portfolio increases.
32
 Hence, it is likely to form a 
portfolio that lacks a certain characteristics, even though the underlying assets have the 
                                               
32 The literature suggests many reasons why this term may be negative, which subsequently leads to a 
portfolio with negatively skewed returns while the stocks in the portfolio are positively skewed. 
Albuquerque (2012) develops a model in which cross-sectional heterogeneity in firm announcement events 
can lead to conditional asymmetric stock return correlations and negative skewness in aggregate returns. 
Hong and Stein (2003) argue that one likely factor is the tendency for managers to release negative firm-
specific information in a gradual piecemeal fashion.   
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very same characteristics. My main variable, MAX, uses only one day return of a 
portfolio over an extended period of time (i.e. one month). Even though the portfolio may 
consist of some stocks that produce MAX over a month, the effect of individual stock 
MAX in the portfolio may not appear in portfolio returns due to correlation of that stock 
with the remaining stocks in that portfolio.
33
 Therefore, given that MAX of an individual 
stock may be weakened in a portfolio; it is less likely that an investor cares about 
individual stock MAX in a fund. 
Retail vs. Non-Retail Funds 
So far I have documented a positive and significant relation between MAX and 
future flows, which is robust to alternative definitions of MAX and controls for other 
fund characteristics. Moreover, this relation is stronger in bigger funds. As argued before, 
one plausible explanation for my findings is that some investors are attracted to lottery 
like-payoffs as modeled in Barberis and Huang (2008) and Brunnermeier, Gollier, and 
Parker (2007). If flow-MAX relation can be attributed to this phenomena, then I expect to 
find a stronger relation between MAX and future flows among retail funds as retail 
investors are documented to more likely exhibit this kind of preference (Kumar (2009), 
Åstebro, Mata, and Santos-Pinto (2009)). To examine this idea, I divide all funds into 
                                               
33 For an illustration, consider the following example with three stocks:  
Period 1   Period2 
A: 15% B:-15% C: 15%     A:-15% B: 15% C: 0% 
For all of the three stocks above (A, B, C), MAX measured over two periods is 15%. Yet, if you invest 
50% on A and B, the portfolio will have 0% in both periods, while if you invest 50% in A and C, then the 
portfolio will have a return of 15% in period 1 and 7.5% in period 2. Hence, Max for portfolio 1 will be 
0%, while Max for portfolio 2 will be 15%. For illustrative purposes, I use two perfectly negatively 
correlated stocks; however, the same argument may apply to any number of stocks with negative cross-
correlations.  
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retail and non-retail funds using the "retail_fund" flag in CRSP.
34
 This flag is available 
from 1999.
35
  
Table 1.8 presents Fama and MacBeth's (1973) regression estimates within retail 
and non-retail funds. Panel A reports the coefficients from piecewise linear regressions 
and Panel B shows the coefficients from quadratic regressions. Within retail funds, the 
coefficient of MAX is 0.192 when normalized performance is used and 0.141 when 
absolute performance is used. Both values are greater than the estimates in Table 1.6 and 
highly statistically significant at 1% level. On the other hand, the corresponding 
coefficients for MAX in non-retail funds are 0.079 and 0.086. Strikingly, none of these 
estimates are statistically significant at any conventional level. Within retail funds, the 
coefficients of MAX increase to 0.230 in piecewise regressions and 0.179 in quadratic 
regressions after controlling for volatility and skewness. They are all statistically 
significant and greater than the coefficients in the regressions that do not use volatility or 
skewness as control variables. Again, in non-retail funds, there is no evidence of a 
significant relation between MAX and fund flows when volatility and skewness are 
included. One exception is that MAX becomes significant in non-retail funds after adding 
both volatility and skewness into piecewise regressions. But this result is not robust to 
using quadratic specification. Therefore, my analysis suggests that the flow-MAX 
relation is more pronounced among retail funds. This is consistent with my priori that the  
                                               
34 There are, on average, 3177 retail funds and 1766 non-retail funds each month in my sample.  
 
35 According to CRSP, retail fund flag determines whether the fund is a retail fund, which caters primarily 
to individual investors. One drawback of this classification is that it may not be a precise identifier of 
investor type. For instance, investment decisions in a 401K plan are eventually taken by individual 
investors. However, capital flows may combine flows of either an institutional or retail fund. Nevertheless, 
it seems reasonable to argue that classification of funds given by CRSP implies differences in investor 
composition of the two types of fund given the fact that majority of retail fund investors are regular 
individuals. Moreover, institutional investors can be expected to invest more in institutional funds to 
exploit the benefits of institutional funds such as low expenses. 
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Table 1.8. Flow-MAX Relation within Retail vs. Non-Retail Funds 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions from 1998/10 to 2010/12 for 
retail and non-retail funds. The dependent variable is the flow ratio. The independent variables are MAX over the 
previous month. Control variables are flows, the logarithm of size, the logarithm of age, 12b-1 fees, Non12b-1 fees, 
rear loads, front load, turnover and fund performance. All control variables are lagged at least one month. All 
specifications include style-dummies. Panel A shows the estimates from piecewise linear regressions, while Panel B 
reports the estimates from quadratic regressions. Newey and West’s (1987) standard errors (6 lags), are in parenthesis.  
 
Panel A: Piecewise Linear Regressions 
 
 Retail Funds Non-Retail Funds 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         MAX 0.192*** 0.241*** 0.175*** 0.230*** 0.079 0.146 0.093* 0.218** 
 
(0.037) (0.044) (0.030) (0.041) (0.051) (0.091) (0.051) (0.101) 
         Volatility 
 
-0.448** 
 
-0.523*** 
 
-0.587*** 
 
-0.635*** 
  
(0.183) 
 
(0.154) 
 
(0.208) 
 
(0.207) 
         Skewness 
  
-0.004*** -0.003** 
  
-0.007*** -0.006*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
         Flow 0.374*** 0.370*** 0.382*** 0.380*** 0.282*** 0.281*** 0.279*** 0.278*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
         Log(Size) -0.150*** -0.176*** -0.117*** -0.121*** -0.060** -0.060** -0.059** -0.059** 
 
(0.036) (0.053) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
         Log(Age) -0.513*** -0.473*** -0.534*** -0.531*** -0.701*** -0.706*** -0.712*** -0.717*** 
 
(0.037) (0.064) (0.030) (0.030) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
         Log(Fsize) 0.040** 0.050** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
         Big Family 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001* 0.002* 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         Star Fund 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         Non12b-1 -0.448*** -0.444*** -0.445*** -0.437*** -0.313*** -0.301*** -0.315*** -0.302*** 
 
(0.053) (0.055) (0.049) (0.048) (0.064) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) 
         12b-1 -0.632*** -0.681*** -0.603*** -0.606*** 0.098 0.091 0.091 0.084 
 
(0.098) (0.117) (0.096) (0.099) (0.203) (0.202) (0.207) (0.207) 
         Rear Load -0.095*** -0.081* -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.106*** -0.107*** 
 
(0.033) (0.046) (0.014) (0.015) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
         Front Load -0.017 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.083*** -0.079** -0.086*** -0.082*** 
 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
         Turnover -0.097 -0.079 -0.020 -0.012 -0.070*** -0.061** -0.081*** -0.070*** 
 
(0.076) (0.068) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
         Low 0.012*** 0.011* 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.006* 0.008** 0.006* 0.008** 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
         Mid 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         High 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
N 435077 435074 434921 434918 191546 191546 183787 183787 
R-sq 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
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Table 1.8 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Quadratic Regressions 
 
 Retail Funds Non-Retail Funds 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 8) 
         MAX 0.141*** 0.183*** 0.133*** 0.179*** 0.086 0.076 0.096* 0.152 
 
(0.036) (0.044) (0.031) (0.041) (0.053) (0.094) (0.053) (0.105) 
         Volatility 
 
-0.528*** 
 
-0.565*** 
 
-0.624*** 
 
-0.671*** 
  
(0.174) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.206) 
         Skewness 
  
-0.004*** -0.003** 
  
-0.006*** -0.006*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.002) 
         Flow 0.374*** 0.370*** 0.381*** 0.379*** 0.281*** 0.280*** 0.279*** 0.278*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
         Log(Size) -0.144*** -0.161*** -0.117*** -0.121*** -0.060** -0.060** -0.059** -0.060** 
 
(0.032) (0.041) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
         Log(Age) -0.523*** -0.501*** -0.534*** -0.531*** -0.701*** -0.705*** -0.712*** -0.716*** 
 
(0.033) (0.042) (0.030) (0.030) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
         Log(Fsize) 0.036** 0.045** 0.023** 0.027*** 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
         BigFam 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001* 0.002* 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         Star Fund 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
         Non12b-1 -0.438*** -0.431*** -0.438*** -0.426*** -0.308*** -0.294*** -0.310*** -0.295*** 
 
(0.052) (0.056) (0.049) (0.048) (0.064) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) 
         12b-1 -0.635*** -0.659*** -0.605*** -0.607*** 0.079 0.068 0.075 0.065 
 
(0.098) (0.105) (0.095) (0.098) (0.202) (0.202) (0.207) (0.206) 
         Rear Load -0.098*** -0.091** -0.124*** -0.125*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.108*** -0.108*** 
 
(0.031) (0.037) (0.014) (0.014) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
         Front Load -0.018 -0.014 -0.005 -0.005 -0.082*** -0.079** -0.085*** -0.082*** 
 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
         Turnover -0.116 -0.106 -0.026 -0.017 -0.070*** -0.061** -0.081*** -0.070*** 
 
(0.089) (0.088) (0.020) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
         Perf 0.172*** 0.193*** 0.179*** 0.203*** 0.132*** 0.141*** 0.135*** 0.143*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
         (Perf)2 1.778*** 1.926*** 1.332*** 1.447*** 1.130*** 1.174*** 1.114*** 1.198*** 
 
(0.473) (0.535) (0.299) (0.323) (0.409) (0.422) (0.421) (0.434) 
N 435077 435074 434921 434918 191546 191546 183787 183787 
R-sq 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
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positive relation between MAX and future flows can be explained by a preference for 
lottery-like payoffs that retail investors are more likely to exhibit. 
While there is a significant difference in the coefficients of MAX between retail 
and non-retail funds, the estimates of other variables are similar in both groups. Most 
importantly, the coefficient of style-adjusted returns in retail funds and non-retail funds 
are similar and the flow-performance relation is convex in both groups in all 
specifications. This finding suggests that the dynamics behind the flow-MAX relation 
cannot be attributed to the previously documented flow-performance relation. Age, size, 
and expenses negatively affect flows (Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997)). Interestingly, retail investors seem to be less responsive to turnover of the fund 
as suggested by the insignificant coefficient, while there is a significant negative effect of 
turnover on future flow in non-retail funds. 
Since retail funds are mainly bigger in size compared to non-retail funds, the 
finding that MAX-flow relation is more pronounced among retail funds might be an 
artifact of size effect.
36
 In order to examine this possibility, I divide the sample into 
groups based on median size (i.e. above-median/below-median), and run separate 
regressions within these groups. All regressions include a dummy variable (retail) that is 
equal to 1 if the fund is a retail fund, zero otherwise, and an interaction term of MAX 
with this dummy. Other control variables are same as in Table 1.8. If retail fund effect is 
not subsumed by fund size, then the coefficient of the dummy variable should be positive. 
For brevity, I only report the coefficients of MAX, interaction term (MAX*retail), 
                                               
36 In my sample, retail funds have an average TNA of $569 million while the average TNA of non-retail 
funds is $270 million. The median TNA of both groups is around $52 million, suggesting that there is more 
skewness in retail fund size. It might be the case that there is a significant MAX-flow relation in relatively 
big non-retail funds, or no MAX-flow relation in small retail funds. 
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volatility, and skewness in Table 1.9. The interaction terms from the regressions in the 
above-median group are all highly significant, while the coefficients of MAX are not.
37
 
Moreover, I also find similar results in the below-median group. Hence, the results 
suggest that even after controlling for size, MAX-flow relation is confined to retail funds 
and do not exist in non-retail funds.  
Interpreting the Results 
 My findings suggest that investors prefer mutual funds that exhibit extreme 
positive returns. If MAX is a predictor of risk-adjusted future performance, then selecting 
based on MAX may be simply an easy way for investors to select well-managed funds. 
But even if MAX-based fund investments underperform, their selection could be rational. 
For example, if lottery-like features enter investors’ utility functions, then choosing such 
funds may be optimal if MAX predicts future MAX. In other words, if lottery-like 
features are persistent and valuable to investors, then MAX-based flows can be rational. 
Preferences for extreme returns have been analyzed before. Using the cumulative 
prospect theory, Barberis and Huang (2008) show that investors, through a weighting 
function, overweight the probabilities in the extremes. For these investors, an asset that 
provide extreme payoff is desirable, even though the probability of the payoff is fairly 
small. Therefore, investors are willing to pay high prices for this asset and accept a lower 
return on average. In addition, Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker (2007) develop a model 
in which investors endogenously increase their beliefs about the probabilities of high 
payoff states in order to maximize their felicity, defined as the discounted present value 
of expected flow utilities. The authors show that this distortion in beliefs leads to a strong  
                                               
37 There is only one case where the coefficient of MAX is itself significant. However, this result is not 
robust to alternative specifications. 
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Table 1.9. Flow-MAX Relation in Retail/Non-Retail Funds after Controlling for Size 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly observations from 
1998/10 to 2010/12 within different size groups. The dependent variable is the flow ratio. Retail is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the fund is a retail fund, zero otherwise. Panel A presents the results for above median size 
group, whereas in Panel B the results for below median size group are presented. Other control variables (omitted) are 
same as in Table 1.8. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 6 
lags) using Newey and West (1987). 
 
Above Median 
 
Piecewise Linear Regression Quadratic Regression 
MAX 0.025 0.123* 0.028 0.127** 0.009 0.102 0.010 0.105* 
 
(0.052) (0.064) (0.053) (0.063) (0.054) (0.064) (0.055) (0.063) 
         MAX*Retail 0.215*** 0.160*** 0.215*** 0.158*** 0.183*** 0.125** 0.185*** 0.125** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) 
         Volatility 
 
-0.491*** 
 
-0.504*** 
 
-0.500*** 
 
-0.514*** 
  
(0.142) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.145) 
 
(0.134) 
         Skewness 
  
-0.005*** -0.004*** 
  
-0.005*** -0.004*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
         N 323545 323545 319389 319389 323545 323545 319389 319389 
R-sq 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
         Below Median 
 
Piecewise Linear Regression Quadratic Regression 
MAX -0.043 0.047 -0.031 0.055 -0.045 0.039 -0.037 0.045 
 
(0.061) (0.067) (0.060) (0.065) (0.061) (0.067) (0.060) (0.066) 
         MAX*Retail 0.173*** 0.159** 0.188*** 0.176*** 0.135** 0.124** 0.150** 0.140** 
 
(0.066) (0.065) (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) 
         Volatility 
 
-0.526*** 
 
-0.548*** 
 
-0.608*** 
 
-0.640*** 
  
(0.192) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.192) 
 
(0.186) 
         Skewness 
  
-0.004*** -0.003** 
  
-0.004*** -0.003** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
         N 303078 303075 299319 299319 303078 303075 299319 299319 
R-sq 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
 
 
preference toward assets with lottery-like features and a relatively lower level of average 
returns from investments.
38
 My results are consistent with the predictions of both models. 
Given the preference of investors for lottery-like features in asset returns, high MAX 
                                               
38 In Barberis and Huang (2008), the overweighting of tails does not represent a bias in beliefs. It is 
exogenously determined by the weighting function and captures the preference for lottery-like return 
distribution. In Brunnermeier, Gollier and Parker (2007), investors choose to bias upward their beliefs 
about the likelihood of positive extreme states since they benefit from this optimism by increasing their 
utility. That is, biases in beliefs are determined endogenously by the economic environment. 
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funds may be attractive to investors if they anticipate similar extreme payoffs from these 
funds in the future. That is, once MAX is realized for a fund, investors may perceive that 
future extreme payoffs are more likely and their asset allocation decisions are affected by 
the expectation of this upside potential given their preferences.
39
 This expectation is 
rational if MAX exhibits persistence. Hence, if MAX indeed exhibits persistence and 
investors derive utility from having a preference to extreme payoffs as in Brunnermeier, 
Gollier, and Parker (2007), then high MAX funds can maximize their utility. Therefore, 
understanding whether MAX predicts future returns or the likelihood of future extreme 
returns or both is important to understand the implications of my findings. In this section, 
I investigate both issues by analyzing the persistence and the future performance of high 
MAX funds.  
Persistence of MAX 
 To examine the persistence of MAX, I first form a transition matrix which gives 
the probability of achieving a ranking of decile j given an initial ranking of decile i over 
the previous month. The results are presented in Figure 1.1. If there is no persistence,  
 then all probabilities should be approximately 10%. Instead, MAX exhibits clearly 
persistence especially in the top and bottom deciles. Funds in the top decile (in one of the 
top three deciles) with respect to MAX are in the top decile (in one of the three deciles) in 
the subsequent month with a probability of 49% (79%). Moreover, in untabulated results, 
I find that funds in the top decile with respect to MAX are in the top decile in month t+3, 
t+6, and t+12 with probabilities of 45%, 43%, and 39%. In an alternative test, for each 
month t+1, I regress MAXt+1 within that month onto MAXt  from the previous month and  
                                               
39 In both Barberis and Huang (2008) and Brunnermeier, Gollier and Parker (2007), investors overestimate 
the probabilities of future extreme payoff states. 
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Figure 1.1. Transition Matrix 
 
Each month, funds are sorted into deciles according to MAX in that month. Independently, funds are sorted into deciles 
according to MAX in the subsequent month. The figure shows the average probability of a fund in decile i according to 
MAX in one month to be in decile j according to MAX in the subsequent month. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
eight lagged (i.e. month t) control variables including the logarithm of size, the logarithm 
of age, Non12b-1 fees,12b-1 fees, front load, rear load, turnover, style-adjusted returns, 
volatility, and skewness. In addition, I conduct the same regressions using MAXt+3, 
MAXt+6, and MAXt+12 as dependent variables. Table 1.10 reports parameter estimates. In 
the univariate regression of MAXt+1 on lagged MAXt, the average cross-sectional 
coefficient is 0.629 with a Newey and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics of 38.08. The R
2 
of the regression is 38%, which indicates a considerable explanatory power. When the 
eight control variables are added to the regression, the coefficient on MAXt remains 
highly significant with a value of 0.612. When MAXt+3, MAXt+6, and MAXt+12 are used as 
dependent variables, the coefficient of MAXt is positive, large, and extremely statistically 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Subsequent  
Ranking 
P
r(
Su
b
se
q
u
e
n
t R
an
ki
n
g|
In
ti
al
 R
an
ki
n
g)
 
Initial Ranking 
  
 
47 
 
significant, suggesting that the persistence of MAX is also strong in the long run. Overall, 
both tests suggest that funds with high MAX in one month are more likely to show the 
same features in the future. If investors indeed derive utility from having a preference to 
extreme payoffs with small probabilities, then it is more likely to gain extreme payoffs if 
they follow high MAX funds. 
Performance-MAX Relation 
To maximize gains from an investment, investors should direct flows into funds 
with better future performance. The previous section shows that funds with high MAX in 
month t enjoy higher flows in month t+1 relative to other funds that have similar 
characteristics. One natural question to ask is whether the funds with high MAX also 
perform better in the future (i.e. in month t+2) compared to other funds that have similar 
characteristics. In other words, I investigate whether investors, who follow a MAX-based 
signal to select their fund investments in month t+1, experience better performance. To 
address this question, I use the following Fama-MacBeth’s (1973) regression model: 
, 2 , , , , ,Performance β MAX δ X εi t i t i t i t i t i t         (1.4) 
where 
, 2Performancei t   refers to the performance of fund i from month t+2. I use five 
different performance measures: raw return, style-adjusted returns, risk-adjusted returns 
according to one factor (CAPM), Fama and French's (1993) three factors and Carhart's 
(1997) four factors model. To calculate the risk-adjusted returns, I proceed as follows: 
For every month t in my sample, I regress funds' excess returns on the risk factors over 
the previous 60 months (i.e. from month t-60 to month t-1) and save the factor loadings. I   
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Table 1.10. Cross sectional Predictability of MAX 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly observations from 
1998/10 to 2010/12 for retail and non-retail funds. The dependent variable is MAX in month t+1, t+3, t+6 or t+12. The 
independent variables are MAX in month t and a set of control variables including style-adjusted returns, flows, the 
logarithm of size, the logarithm of age, 12b-1 fees, Non12b-1 fees (as measured by the difference between expense 
ratios and 12b-1 fees), rear loads, front load, turnover, volatility and skewness. All control variables are lagged at least 
one month. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 6 lags) using 
Newey and West (1987). 
 
Dep. Variable MAXt+1 MAXt+3 MAXt+6 MAXt+12 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         MAX 0.629*** 0.612*** 0.630*** 0.579*** 0.604*** 0.550*** 0.553*** 0.521*** 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.028) (0.029) (0.034) (0.040) 
         Return 
 
-0.042*** 
 
-0.040*** 
 
-0.034*** 
 
-0.035*** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
         Flow 
 
0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
         Log(Size) 
 
0.012 
 
0.024** 
 
0.027** 
 
0.031* 
  
(0.012) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.016) 
         Log(Age) 
 
0.019 
 
0.016 
 
0.030 
 
0.035 
  
(0.020) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.034) 
         Non12b-1 
 
0.124*** 
 
0.142*** 
 
0.156*** 
 
0.175*** 
  
(0.013) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.019) 
         12b-1 
 
-0.020*** 
 
-0.020*** 
 
-0.017*** 
 
-0.019*** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
         Rear Load 
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.004*** 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
         Front Load 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.005*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
         Volatility 
 
0.144*** 
 
0.116*** 
 
0.084** 
 
0.022 
  
(0.028) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.040) 
         Skewness 
 
0.001** 
 
0.001* 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001* 
  
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
         N 719883 652864 782175 634782 742055 608183 665931 556237 
R-sq 0.38 0.46 0.38 0.42 0.36 0.38 0.31 0.33 
 
 
require at least 48 months in the preceding 60 months to run the regression.
40
 Then, I 
estimate the risk-adjusted return in month t as the difference between the fund's realized 
                                               
40 Although a longer estimation period excludes a greater fraction of funds from the sample, this is not a 
major problem for my sample since I utilize monthly return data before 1998. If a fund has monthly returns 
data before October, 1998- the first month my sample starts- then, I use all available data in order to 
calculate risk-adjusted returns. This allows me to keep as many data points as possible for each fund after 
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excess return and the required return, defined as the factor loadings times the 
corresponding factor realizations in month t. The control variables include the logarithm 
of fund size, the logarithm of fund age, Non12b-1, 12b-1, turnover, monthly flow, front 
load, rear load, and performance (Chen et. al. (2004)). All control variables are lagged at 
least one month.  
 Results are in Table 1.11. The coefficients of MAX are negative in all 
specifications. An increase of 1% daily return in MAX decreases raw returns by 10 bps 
and style-adjusted returns by 9 bps in month t+2. For risk-adjusted returns, the effect of 
MAX varies between 7.7 bps and 13.5 bps. There is some evidence of short-term 
performance persistence as revealed by the positive coefficient of the lagged 
performance. That is, even though both high MAX and better performance lead to higher 
flows in the future, the effect of MAX on future performance is different than that of 
prior performance.
41
 
 I also use 3-month (from t+2 to t+4), 6-month (from t+2 to t+7), and 12-month 
(from t+2 to t+13) returns as dependent variables in order to analyze the long-term 
relation between MAX and performance. The regressions use the same control variables. 
In Table 1.12, I only report the coefficients for MAX and omit the coefficients for other 
control variables from the table. All coefficient estimates are negative and in all but one  
specification they are statistically significant at conventional levels. The coefficients vary 
                                                                                                                                            
October, 1998. However, the results are qualitatively similar if I do not use data before 1998, and hence 
start the sample by 2003. Moreover, using a longer estimation period also reduces the sampling error in 
betas and mitigates the effect of incubation bias that affects mostly the subset of young funds in the CRSP 
database. Nevertheless, I also estimate the betas using previous 36 months and the results are qualitatively 
similar.  
 
41 In further tests, I control for volatility and skewness. Moreover, I also run a regression with flows 
andreturns in month t+1 as control variables. Results are similar and available upon request. 
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Table 1.11. Flow-Performance Relation 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly observations for 
funds from 1998/10 to 2010/12. The dependent variable is the fund performance in month t+2. The independent 
variables are MAX and a set of control variables including flows, the logarithm of size, the logarithm of age, 12b-1 
fees, Non12b-1 fees (as measured by the difference between expense ratios and 12b-1 fees), rear loads, front load, 
turnover and fund performance. All independent variables are lagged at least two months and all specifications include 
style-dummies. I use five different performance measures: raw return, style-adjusted return, and risk-adjusted returns 
according to one factor (CAPM), Fama and French's (1993) three factors and Carhart's (1997) four-factor models. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 6 lags) using Newey and 
West (1987). 
 
 
Raw Return 
Style-adjusted 
Return 
Capm-adjusted 
Return 
FF-adjusted 
Return 
Carhart-adjusted 
Return 
      MAX -0.105*** -0.091* -0.135** -0.107** -0.077** 
 
(0.038) (0.054) (0.052) (0.043) (0.037) 
      Flow 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.004** 0.005*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      Log(Size) -0.007 -0.012 -0.002 0.05 0.042 
 
(0.044) (0.051) (0.045) (0.056) (0.064) 
      Log(Age) -0.045 -0.03 0.042 -0.073 -0.056 
 
(0.097) (0.112) (0.103) (0.116) (0.110) 
      Non12b-1 -0.048** -0.040* -0.072** -0.078** -0.067* 
 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) (0.035) 
      12b-1 -0.095*** -0.099*** -0.090*** -0.077*** -0.079*** 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) 
      Rear Load -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      Front Load -0.004** -0.004** -0.003 -0.004** -0.003* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      Turnover -0.032 0.110 0.063 0.101 -0.166 
 
(0.360) (0.407) (0.377) (0.322) (0.300) 
      Perf 0.040* 0.042* 0.043* 0.032 0.026 
 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) 
      N 639545 639545 461539 461539 461539 
R-sq 0.42 0.12 0.40 0.22 0.20 
 
 
between 23 bps and 35 bps for 3-month returns, 36 bps and 56 bps for 6-month returns, 
and 44 bps and 87 bps for 12-month returns. To sum up, these results show that there is a 
negative and significant relationship between future fund performance and MAX, which 
suggests that directing incremental flows into funds with high MAX is costly for fund 
investors in terms of expected returns. This finding is consistent with Frazzini and 
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Lamont (2008), who argue that retail investors direct their money to funds with 
overpriced stocks, and with Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) that show that stocks with 
extreme positive returns are overpriced. On the other hand, Edelen (1999) states that fund 
managers engage in costly liquidity based trading in order to provide liquidity services to 
their investors. Edelen (1999) estimates that around 28% of total trading activity can be 
characterized as liquidity motivated and is associated with an estimated 1.5% decline in 
abnormal returns. Alexander, Cici, and Gibson (2007) show that liquidity trades occur 
mostly during fund inflows while fund outflow cause valuation motivated trades. Hence 
if MAX leads to more inflows then it may also cause more liquidity based trading and the 
subsequent underperformance. 
 
Table 1.12.  Flow-Performance Relation over Longer Horizons 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates of MAX from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly 
observations for funds from 1998/10 to 2009/12. The dependent variables are 3-month (from t+2 to t+4), 6-month 
(from t+2 to t+7), and 12-month fund performance. The independent variables are MAX and a set of control variables 
including flows, the logarithm of size, the logarithm of age, 12b-1 fees, Non12b-1 fees (as measured by the difference 
between expense ratios and 12b-1 fees), rear loads, front load, turnover and fund performance. All independent 
variables are lagged at least two months and all specifications include style-dummies. I use five different performance 
measures: raw return, style-adjusted return, and risk-adjusted returns according to one factor (CAPM), Fama and 
French's (1993) three factors and Carhart's (1997) four-factor models. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 6 lags) using Newey and West (1987). 
 
 
Raw Return 
Style-adjusted 
Return 
Capm-adjusted 
Return 
FF-adjusted 
Return 
Carhart-adjusted 
Return 
3-month -0.248** -0.233* -0.353*** -0.297*** -0.238** 
 
(0.104) (0.135) (0.125) (0.099) (0.093) 
      
6-month -0.385* -0.358* -0.559** -0.491*** -0.354** 
 
(0.179) (0.206) (0.217) (0.163) (0.160) 
      
12-month -0.519** -0.443 -0.870*** -0.738*** -0.486** 
 
(0.327) (0.336) (0.365) (0.284) (0.222) 
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A Closer Look at Idiosyncratic Volatility, Skewness and MIN 
 In previous tests, I use total volatility and skewness as control variables. Since 
MAX is almost exclusively idiosyncratic in nature, there may be still a concern whether 
MAX is a good proxy for idiosyncratic volatility or skewness rather than total volatility 
or skewness.
42
 Moreover, similar to the attraction to high MAX funds, investors may 
dislike funds with minimum extreme returns (MIN).
43
 Therefore, to assess the robustness 
of my results, I analyze the link, if any, between idiosyncratic volatility, idiosyncratic 
skewness and MIN.  
 Idiosyncratic volatility (Ivolatility) is calculated by the standard deviation of the 
residuals from a single factor in each month t: 
, , , , ,R r β (R r ) εi d f d i m d f d i d          (1.5) 
where 
, , ,R ,  R ,  i d m d i d  are the fund return, market returns and  the idiosyncratic return on 
day d.
44
 I follow Harvey and Siddique (2000) in order to decompose skewness into 
idiosyncratic and systematic components by estimating the following regression for each 
fund over the previous 12 months: 
2
, , , , , , ,R r β (R r ) θ (R r ) εi d f d i m d f d i m d f d i d          
 (1.6) 
The idiosyncratic skewness (Iskewness) is defined as the skewness of daily residuals     . 
Lastly, analogous to MAX, MIN is defined as the style-adjusted minimum daily returns 
                                               
42 Mitton and Vorkink (2007) develop a model in which investors have heterogeneous preference for 
skewness. The model demonstrates that, given the lack of diversification in investor holdings, investors 
overvalue the stocks with higher idiosyncratic skewness and earn lower expected returns from these stocks.  
 
43 The theoretical work of Barberis and Huang (2008) predicts that investors overweight the probabilities of 
large losses, and thus the effect of minimum daily returns (MIN) should be opposite of MAX.  However, in 
the model of Brunnermeir, Gollier, and Parker (2007), investors underweight rather than overweight 
minimum returns, and hence the pricing implication of minimum returns is different than that of Barberis 
and Huang (2008).  
 
44 The results hold if I use the four factor model instead. 
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over a month. Not surprisingly, MAX is highly correlated with Ivolatility and MIN. The 
average cross-sectional correlation between MAX and Ivolatility and MAX 70%, while 
the correlation between MAX and MIN is -66%. On the other hand, the correlation 
between MAX and Iskewness is very low (0.6%). 
 I first construct double sorted portfolios. That is, I sort all funds into three groups- 
Bottom, Mid, Top-based upon a 20:60:20 split. Then within each group, I further sort the 
funds into deciles based on MAX within the same month. This creates 30 portfolios 
which are held for a month after portfolio formation. Table 1.13 reports average flows for 
30 portfolios in the subsequent month and the flow difference between high MAX (decile 
10) and low MAX (decile 1) portfolios. The results suggest that the effect of MAX is 
robust to controlling for Ivolatility, Iskewness and MIN. The flow difference between 
High and Low MAX portfolios is greater for funds with higher Ivolatility, lower 
Iskewness, and lower MIN. Next, I conduct Fama and MacBeth's (1973) regressions 
using the whole sample as well as within the retail and non-retail funds. Table 1.14 
reports the time series average of cross-sectional regressions. In the regressions with the 
whole sample, the coefficients of MAX range between 0.251 and 0.094, and are highly 
statistically significant. Idiosyncratic volatility and idiosyncratic skewnesss affect fund 
flows negatively, echoing the regression estimates of total volatility and skewness. The 
effect of MIN is also negative, albeit weaker than that of MAX, suggesting that the 
response of investors to extreme returns is asymmetric. It might be due to the fact that 
mostly investors that already purchased a fund would react to MIN, while MAX may 
attract both the existing and potential investors in the market. When I divide the whole  
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Table 1.13. Average Flow of Funds Sorted on MAX after Controlling for 
Idiosyncratic Volatility, Idiosyncratic Skewness, and MIN 
 
Each month t from 1998/9 to 2010/12, funds are ranked in ascending order according to idiosyncratic volatility, 
idiosyncratic skewness or MIN in month t and are allocated into three groups- Bottom, Mid, Top-based upon a 
20:60:20 split. Bottom (Top) refers to the group of funds that are in the bottom (top) 20% of all funds ranked according 
to the fund characteristic. Mid includes funds that are in the 2nd-4th quintiles according to the fund characteristics. Then 
within each group, I further sort the funds into deciles based on MAX within the same month. This creates 30 portfolios 
which are held for a month after portfolio formation. This table reports equally weighted monthly portfolio flows (for 
each decile in month t+1. Decile 1(10) is the group of funds with the lowest (highest) MAX. Flow is the growth rate of 
assets under management due to new investments. The last row (HM-LM) presents the difference of flow ratios 
between the High MAX (decile 10) and Low MAX (decile 1) groups. Newey and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics (up 
to 6 lags) are reported in parenthesis. All values except the t-statistics are given in percentage terms. 
 
 
 
the sample into retail and non-retail funds, I find that the coefficient of MAX is 
significant only in retail funds. On the other hand, the relation between fund flows and 
other fund characteristics, such as performance, holds for both groups. Overall, these 
additional tests suggest that the impact of MAX is robust to using idiosyncratic volatility, 
skewness, and MIN. 
Some Robustness Tests 
In my previous analysis, I control for volatility and skewness to show that the 
effect of MAX is not subsumed by these variables. I measure volatility using daily  
 
Iskewness Ivolatility Min 
  Bottom Mid Top Bottom Mid Top Bottom Mid Top 
Low MAX 0.49 0.35 0.12 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.22 0.26 0.41 
2 0.73 0.46 0.08 0.30 0.43 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.36 
3 0.77 0.40 0.23 0.26 0.42 0.56 0.44 0.43 0.36 
4 0.81 0.50 0.19 0.30 0.53 0.62 0.47 0.51 0.47 
5 0.83 0.58 0.18 0.45 0.60 0.67 0.59 0.53 0.62 
6 0.98 0.58 0.26 0.42 0.59 0.81 0.63 0.58 0.43 
7 0.97 0.56 0.41 0.41 0.63 0.85 0.80 0.61 0.52 
8 1.12 0.54 0.31 0.51 0.62 1.03 0.95 0.64 0.62 
9 1.17 0.68 0.56 0.61 0.71 1.00 0.99 0.76 0.79 
High MAX 1.44 1.03 0.83 0.89 0.93 1.38 1.49 1.01 0.94 
HM-LM 0.95 0.68 0.71 0.50 0.61 1.10 1.27 0.75 0.53 
 
(4.23) (4.48) (3.38) (4.41) (4.85) (5.71) (6.17) (4.39) (3.61) 
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Table 1.14. Flow-MAX Relation with Ivolatility, Iskewness, and MIN 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly observations from 1998/10 to 2010/12 for all funds as well as retail 
and non-retail funds. The dependent variable is the flow ratio. The independent variables are MAX over the previous month and a set of control variables including 
flows, the  logarithm of size, the logarithm of age, 12b-1 fees, Non12b-1 fees (as measured by the difference between expense ratios and 12b-1 fees), rear loads, front 
load, turnover and fund performance. All control variables are lagged at least one month. All specifications include style-dummies. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 6 lags) using Newey and West (1987). 
 
 All Funds Retail Funds Non-Retail Funds 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          MAX 0.251*** 0.139*** 0.094** 0.201** 0.158*** 0.160** 0.172* 0.078 0.098 
 
(0.050) (0.027) (0.037) (0.077) (0.030) (0.065) (0.090) (0.053) (0.066) 
          Ivolatility -0.468*** 
  
-0.127 
  
-0.405** 
  
 
(0.161) 
  
(0.317) 
  
(0.193) 
  
          Iskewness 0.000 
  
0.000 
  
0.001 
 
  
0.000  
  
0.000  
  
0.000  
 
          MIN 
  
-0.070* 
  
-0.049 
  
0.047 
   
(0.041) 
  
(0.058) 
  
(0.067) 
          Flow 0.346*** 0.347*** 0.346*** 0.372*** 0.382*** 0.373*** 0.281*** 0.280*** 0.281*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
          Log(Size) -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.156*** -0.118*** -0.157*** -0.061** -0.058** -0.061** 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.039) (0.017) (0.039) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
          Log(Fsize) 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.037** 0.026*** 0.042** 0.114*** 0.118*** 0.115*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
          Big Family 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
          Star Fund 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
          Log(Age) -0.580*** -0.586*** -0.581*** -0.502*** -0.535*** -0.494*** -0.701*** -0.710*** -0.703*** 
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.043) (0.030) (0.050) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) 
          Non12b-1 -0.391*** -0.406*** -0.404*** -0.470*** -0.436*** -0.428*** -0.299*** -0.312*** -0.306*** 
 
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.065) (0.049) (0.057) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
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Table 1.14 (Continued) 
 
All Funds Retail Funds Non-Retail Funds 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          12b-1 -0.707*** -0.736*** -0.710*** -0.596*** -0.610*** -0.630*** 0.092 0.097 0.083 
 
(0.104) (0.101) (0.103) (0.095) (0.095) (0.097) (0.203) (0.209) (0.203) 
          Rear Load -0.136*** -0.140*** -0.135*** -0.095*** -0.124*** -0.095*** -0.102*** -0.106*** -0.101*** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.033) (0.014) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) 
          Front Load -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.017 -0.006 -0.014 -0.082*** -0.087*** -0.081*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
          Turnover -0.060** -0.057** -0.065** -0.089 -0.037 -0.145 -0.089*** -0.084*** -0.091*** 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.054) (0.028) (0.094) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
          Low 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.011** 0.005 0.005 0.006* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
          Mid 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
          High 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
         
N 626648 618736 626651 435097 434944 435100 191551 183792 191551 
R-sq 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.14 
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returns over a month, while skewness is measured using daily returns over the previous 
12 months. Even though these measurement periods are the mostly commonly used in the 
existing literature, in this section, I use alternative measurement periods to assess the 
robustness of my results. Specifically, I calculate volatility using daily returns over the 
previous 3,6, and 12 months, and skewness  using daily returns over the previous 1, 3, 
and 6 months. Panel A of Table 1.15 reports the coefficients of MAX from piecewise 
linear regressions as in Table 1.6, when volatility and skewness with alternative 
measurement periods are used.
45
 The effect of MAX in all regressions is highly 
statistically significant, and if anything, the effect of MAX increases as skewness 
measured over shorter periods is used.  
In Table 1.4, I sort funds according to alternative definitions of MAX to see 
whether there is a flow spread among fund portfolios when alternative MAX measures 
are used in sorting. In this section, I test the flow-MAX relation in a multivariate setting 
by using these alternative definitions of MAX. Specifically, I use: (1) MAX measured as 
the average of highest 2, 3, 4, 5 style-adjusted daily returns over a month, (2) MAX 
measured as the single highest style-adjusted daily return over the previous 3, 6, and 12 
months, (3) the average of single day MAX in a month over the previous 3, 6, and 12 
months. For brevity, Panel B of Table 1.15 only reports the coefficients of MAX both 
from piecewise linear and quadratic regressions. Three main results emerge: (1) The 
effect of MAX increases as I average over more days, (2) the effect of MAX declines but 
remains significant as longer periods are used, (3) the effect of MAX is substantially 
                                               
45 The results from quadratic regressions are similar and omitted for brevity. 
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Table 1.15. Flow-MAX Relation with Alternative Specifications 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly observations for funds from 1998/10 to 2010/12. Panel A reports the 
coefficient estimates of MAX from piecewise linear regressions when skewness and volatility are measured over alternative periods. Panel B report the coefficient 
estimates of  MAX from piecewise and quadratic regressions when alternative MAX definitions are used. MAX [N] is the average of N (N=2, 3, 4, 5) highest daily style-
adjusted returns in a month. MAX [1]K  is the average highest daily style-adjusted return over the previous K months where K=3,6,12 months. AMAX3 to AMAX12    are 
the average of single day MAX over the previous 3, 6, 12 months.  
 
Panel A: Coefficients of MAX with alternative measures of skewness and volatility measurement periods 
 
    Skewness 
  
1-month 3-month 6-month 12-month 
Volatility 
1-month 0.247*** 0.249*** 0.247*** 0.239*** 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
    
3-month 0.241*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.223*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) 
     
6-month 0.237*** 0.229*** 0.227*** 0.219*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
     
12-month 0.235*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.212*** 
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) 
 
Panel B: Coefficients of MAX with alternative MAX definitions  
 
Piecewise Linear Regressions 
MAX[2] MAX[3] MAX[4] MAX[5] MAX[1]3 MAX[1]6 MAX[1]12 AMAX3 AMAX6 AMAX12 
          
0.210*** 0.258*** 0.307*** 0.349*** 0.167*** 0.129*** 0.080*** 0.333*** 0.394*** 0.417*** 
(0.035) (0.042) (0.048) (0.055) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.038) (0.046) (0.048) 
 
Quadratic Regressions 
MAX[2] MAX[3] MAX[4] MAX[5] MAX[1]3 MAX[1]6 MAX[1]12 AMAX3 AMAX6 AMAX12 
          
0.166*** 0.206*** 0.250*** 0.286*** 0.163*** 0.126*** 0.074*** 0.332*** 0.404*** 0.429*** 
(0.038) (0.045) (0.051) (0.058) (0.027) (0.026) (0.022) (0.040) (0.051) (0.055) 
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greater if I use the average single day MAX in a month over past periods. The findings 
suggest that investors are increasingly attracted to MAX funds if these funds produce 
high MAX on average.  
In my second essay, using a conditional setting, I show that long-term 
performance affects the sensitivity of flows to recent performance. Specifically, good 
(bad) long-term performance increases (decreases) the sensitivity of flows to recent 
performance. Hence, it is difficult to properly interpret the relation between short-term 
performance and flows from a model that omits long-term performance. In order to test 
whether the effect of MAX is robust to the presence of long-term performance, I 
calculate the average monthly returns over the previous 12 months (from t-1 to t-12)
46
. 
Then I run Fama and Macbeth’s (1973) regressions that includes 12 months average 
performance as well as the interaction terms of these variables with short-term 
performance- Low, Mid, High- which is measured in month t. The dependent variable is 
flows in month t+1 and all other control variables are same as in Table 1.6. Results are 
shown in Table 1.16. Even though long-term performance significantly affects future 
flows, the coefficient of MAX also remains significant in all specifications, and ranges 
between 0.118 and 0.276.  
Consistent with the results in my second essay, long-term performance positively 
affects the future flows as well as the sensitivity of flows to recent month performance. 
My results show that the effect of MAX and long-term performance do not subsume each 
other, but coexist. This is consistent with the idea that investors optimize their decisions 
based on a multi-attribute model, in which investors attribute positive value to different   
                                               
46 Using 24 or 36 months does not change inferences. Moreover, using average of risk-adjusted returns over 
the previous 12 months (from t-1 to t-12) does not change the inferences. 
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Table 1.16. Flow-MAX Relation after Controlling for Long-term Performance 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly observations from 
1998/10 to 2010/12 for all funds. The dependent variable is the flow ratio. LTPerf is the average month returns over the 
previous 12 month from t-1 to t-12. The independent variables are MAX over the previous month and a set of control 
variables (omitted for brevity) including flows, the  logarithm of size, the logarithm of age, 12b-1 fees, Non12b-1 fees 
(as measured by the difference between expense ratios and 12b-1 fees), rear loads, front load, turnover and fund 
performance. All control variables are lagged at least one month. All specifications include style-dummies. Standard 
errors (in parenthesis) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 6 lags) using Newey and West 
(1987). 
 
Dep. Variables Flows (in month t+1) 
    
MAX 0.118*** 0.276*** 0.184*** 
 
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040) 
    Volatility 
 
-0.627*** 
 
  
(0.149) 
 
    Skewness 
  
-0.000 
   
(0.001) 
    LTPerf 0.705*** 0.621*** 0.611*** 
 
(0.092) (0.069) (0.075) 
    Low 0.015** 0.005 0.003 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
    Mid 0.001 0.002** 0.002** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    High 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
    Low*LTPerf 1.098*** 2.218*** 2.290*** 
 
(0.269) (0.496) (0.483) 
    Mid*LTPerf 0.176*** 0.172*** 0.162*** 
 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.060) 
    High*LTPerf 0.945** 0.715* 0.765** 
 
(0.438) (0.381) (0.373) 
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fund characteristics (Fishbein and Azjen (1975), Lanchaster (1966), and Capon, 
Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996)). It might be the case that some investors care more about 
the long-term performance while the others follow a short-term approach and consider 
MAX as an important factor in their decisions. Since my data is not at the individual 
level, my tests do not allow differentiating among investors who use long-term 
performance, MAX or both. Nevertheless, if a sizable portion of investors use  
long-term performance or MAX in their decisions, then fund flows will reflect the effect 
of both characteristics.  
Even though I correct standard errors for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, 
there might be still concern that standard errors are underestimated. Therefore, as a last 
check, I test the flow-Max relation in Table 1.17  by using panel regressions, where 
standard errors are clustered by fund and month (Peterson (2009)). Table 1.17 shows the 
results. In all specifications, MAX load positively and significantly, and its effect 
increase as I include volatility and skewness as additional control variables. One 
difference is that skewness has a negative but insignificant effect on fund flows while 
Fama-Macbeth’s (1973) regressions show a negative and significant coefficient.47 
Overall, the effect of MAX on future flows does not depend on the regression method 
used.  
Chapter Conclusion 
Existing theoretical models argue that investors' trading decisions may be 
influenced by a preference for lottery-like features (i.e. high payoffs with small  
                                               
47 I also consider fixed-effect regressions with robust standard errors. Fixed effect regressions focus on the 
within-fund variation and ignore the between-fund variation. The result is robust to this specification as the 
coefficient of MAX is significant with a t-value of 2.35, suggesting that there is some variation in MAX 
within each fund.   
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Table 1.17. Flow-MAX Relation (Panel Regressions) 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions for funds from 1998/10 to 
2010/12. The dependent variable is the flow ratio. The independent variables are MAX over the previous month and a 
set of control variables including volatility and skewness of fund returns, flows, the logarithm of size, the logarithm of 
age, the logarithm of family size, 12b-1 fees, Non12b-1 fees (as measured by the difference between expense ratios and 
12b-1 fees), rear loads, front load, turnover, star-fund dummy, big-family dummy, and fund performance. All control 
variables are lagged at least one month and all specifications include style-dummies. The specifications in column 1, 3, 
and 5 use the normalized performance (Low, Mid, High), while the specifications in column 2, 4, and 6 use the style-
adjusted return and its quadratic term. Standard are clustered by month. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MAX 0.118** 0.204*** 0.125** 0.212*** 0.104** 0.190*** 0.111** 0.198*** 
 
(0.050) (0.046) (0.052) (0.048) (0.049) (0.045) (0.051) (0.046) 
         Volatility 
 
-0.122** 
 
-0.123** 
 
-0.122** 
 
-0.123** 
  
(0.049) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.051) 
         Skewness 
  
-0.001 -0.001 
  
-0.001 -0.001 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
         Flow 0.362*** 0.361*** 0.361*** 0.360*** 0.361*** 0.361*** 0.361*** 0.360*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
         Log(Size) -0.046* -0.050** -0.045* -0.049** -0.047** -0.051** -0.045* -0.050** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
         Log(Age) -0.735*** -0.727*** -0.742*** -0.732*** -0.732*** -0.724*** -0.739*** -0.730*** 
 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
         Log(Fsize) 0.010 0.014 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.008 0.013 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
         BigFam 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         Star Fund 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
         Non12b-1 -0.372*** -0.391*** -0.367*** -0.388*** -0.360*** -0.382*** -0.355*** -0.378*** 
 
(0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) 
         12b-1 -0.667*** -0.675*** -0.711*** -0.719*** -0.677*** -0.685*** -0.720*** -0.729*** 
 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.070) (0.070) (0.074) (0.075) (0.070) (0.070) 
         Rear Load -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.118*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
         Front Load -0.010 -0.011 -0.014* -0.015** -0.010 -0.011 -0.014* -0.015** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
         Turnover -0.018 -0.016 -0.020 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 -0.020 -0.017 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
         Low 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
    
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
         Mid 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
         High 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 
    
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
    
         Perf 
    
0.116*** 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.111*** 
     
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
         (Perf)2 
    
0.289*** 0.269*** 0.292*** 0.271*** 
     
(0.096) (0.094) (0.097) (0.095) 
N 626623 626620 618708 618705 626623 626620 618708 618705 
R-sq 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
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probabilities) in asset returns. Consistent with these arguments, I document a positive 
relationship between maximum style-adjusted daily returns (MAX) and future fund 
flows. My results are robust to various control variables including fund performance, 
fund size, age, turnover, fund fees, (idiosyncratic) volatility, and (idiosyncratic) skewness 
of fund returns. The flow-MAX relationship exists only among funds that cater primarily 
to retail investors. The results suggest that mutual fund investors, in particular retail 
investors, have a preference for funds with extreme positive returns although the   
probability of occurrence of large payoffs might be small. Because MAX is persistent, 
my results suggest that investors are successful in identifying lottery-like payoffs. But 
funds with high MAX underperform otherwise similar funds. This implies that selecting 
lottery like payoffs is costly.  
 My results have implications for the literature on determinants of mutual fund 
flows.  While the question whether mutual fund managers strategically choose to have 
extreme daily returns is beyond the scope of this chapter, my results suggest that they 
would benefit from MAX as their compensation is tied to total assets under management. 
It would be interesting to see if fund managers have incentives to compete on MAX-
based strategies. For instance, since high MAX funds underperform in the future, there 
will be a loss of flows. However, the additional flows from lottery-like returns may be 
high enough to compensate this cost, which might incentivize managers to take skewed-
bets in order to boost their flows.  
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CHAPTER III 
FUND FLOWS AND PERFORMANCE: LONG-TERM VS. SHORT-TERM 
Introduction 
Investors tend to buy funds with recent superior performance (Gruber (1996), 
Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Skilled managers are more likely to deliver higher performance 
and hence investors rationally flock to funds with recent superior performance assuming 
that it will persist into the future. These findings are consistent with theoretical models in 
the mutual fund literature, which generally posits that investors can infer the managerial 
ability from past returns (see Ippolito (1992), and Berk and Green (2004)) and direct 
capital to good performers. Investors can trade on recent signals particularly if there is 
imperfect information about the managers' ability (Scharfstein and Stein (1990)) or if 
managers’ abilities and level of effort change in a dynamic environment (Ippolito 
(1992)). Accordingly, Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show that 
prior year returns affect flows in the subsequent year. Cashman et. al. (2006) show a 
similar relation between monthly flows and prior month returns. 
In this essay, I investigate the effect of long-term performance and short-term 
performance on future fund flows. Presumably there is less noisy and more information 
about manager skills in returns measured over a longer period compared to returns 
measured over a shorter period. For instance, a favorable quarter after a good two-year 
performance might be a stronger signal of managerial ability then a favorable quarter 
preceded by a poor two-year performance. More generally, the longer-term performance 
history may enhance the confidence with which investors assess the manager’s ability. If 
so, this would affect the sensitivity of flows to recent performance.  
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This analysis is important because it sheds light on investors' short-termism and 
its associated negative consequences such as myopic investment decisions taken by 
managers.
48
 If investors indeed use short-term results as a signal for investment decisions, 
then fund managers will have incentives to perform in the short run. Consistent with this 
inference, Jin and Kogan (2007) demonstrates that funds with higher short term 
performance pressure focus on short term profits at the cost of long run profits. 
My results suggest that investors' decisions are strongly governed by longer-term 
rather than shorter-term fund performance. More precisely, both the direction of future 
flows to the fund and the effect of shorter-term performance depend on a fund’s longer-
term performance. In particular, long-term winner funds obtain positive net flows, even 
though they underperform in the recent quarter. Long-term losers experience outflows 
despite a superior performance in the recent quarter. But long-term winners gain more 
inflows if their recent performance is also good and long-term losers experience more 
outflows if their recent performance is also poor.  
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) document that fund flows into young funds are more 
sensitive to recent performance than flows into older funds. In a recent paper, Huang, 
Wei, and Yan (2012) confirm this dampening effect of fund age on sensitivity of fund 
flows on recent performance. Combining size and age, Sawicki and Finn (2002) find that 
investors respond more strongly to recent performance of small and young funds than to 
recent performance of large and old funds. This finding supports the idea that investors 
attempt to infer the quality of a fund from past performance. Since the lack of long track 
records increases the uncertainty regarding fund quality, investors rely more on recent 
performance to form their expectations, and hence the sensitivity of fund flows to recent 
                                               
48 See, for example, Meulbroek et. al. (1990), Bushee (1998), and Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005). 
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performance increases. Different from these papers, I concentrate on the content of past 
track records rather than its existence, using the level of long-term performance. I find 
that favorable long-term performance actually reinforces the effect of recent performance 
on future fund flows, which is opposite of age effect. Furthermore, my additional test 
shows that the effect of long-term performance on the flow-recent performance relation 
do not change across different age or size groups, implying that investors do not ignore 
the long-term performance in younger funds. 
In addition to large flows for recent winners, the literature documents an absence 
of net outflows in the face of recent poor performance. Several researchers give plausible 
explanations that contribute to this convexity in the flow-performance relation. Gruber 
(1996) suggests that some investors fail to respond to poor performance due to the 
influence of advertising, brokers' advice, or market frictions such as tax inefficiencies. 
Lynch and Musto (2003) argue that investors rationally choose not to respond to poor 
performance since they expect that funds will change their personnel or strategies that 
produce it. Alternatively, Goetzmann and Peles (1997) show that investors suffer from 
cognitive dissonance, where they become over-optimistic about fund returns to justify 
their poor decisions. Moreover, Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1992) hypothesize that 
flows to mutual funds may reflect status quo bias, framing, and data packaging
49
.  
My analysis highlights the importance of long-term performance on the shape of 
the flow-performance relation. I show that the convexity is mainly driven by long-term 
winners who experience a short period of poor performance. Investors do not ignore the 
                                               
49 The framing/data packaging conjectures that people give their decisions based on the most direct 
evidence. Therefore, flows follow the performance rankings, which are available on a regular and timely 
basis. However, investors also tend to stick with the strategies already adopted because of a reluctance to 
depart from status quo. 
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poor recent performance. Instead, they put more weight on the positive long-term 
performance. This makes it difficult to properly interpret the relation between short-term 
performance and flows from a model that omits long-term performance.  
One important consequence of the convexity in the flow-performance relation is a 
possible distortion in managerial incentives. Since investors reward high performance but 
do not punish poor performance, fund managers have a free option to increase the 
riskiness of the portfolio to enhance the expected flows. Brown, Harlow, and Starks 
(1996), and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find evidence of this excessive risk taking 
behavior in the funds with poor performance. In a recent paper, Huang, Sialm, and Zhang 
(2011) investigate the performance consequences of such risk-shifting. They document 
that funds that increase risk perform worse than those that keep risk stable over time. My 
results imply that greater risk-taking is not a completely free option for all funds. For 
instance, if a recent loser fund deliberately increases its risk and underperforms in the 
future as well, then the fund loses assets as investors eventually withdraw their capital.  
Prior research has also investigated investors' sophistication using the 
performance of flows as a metric. Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) find evidence that the 
risk-adjusted short term performance of funds that experience inflows is better than that 
of funds that experience outflows. On the other hand, Sapp and Tiwari (2004) argue that 
this effect is due to a return momentum of the stocks in those funds. Additionally, 
Frazinni and Lamont (2008) document that the smart money is, at best, confined to very 
short time periods. Even though there is empirical controversy in the performance of fund 
flows, it raises the possibility that fund flows may cause fund performance rather than 
performance causes fund flows. Thus, the causal relation between performance and fund 
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flows is a key point in the interpretation of flow-performance relation, yet this seems to 
be largely ignored by previous research. To partially address this concern, I conduct 
Granger causality tests in a VAR framework. Using fund portfolios sorted on size, age 
and styles, I find that performance Granger causes future fund flows, but there is no 
evidence of a reverse causality. 
Overall, my findings are consistent with the idea that investors use information in 
past returns as signals about manager skills and future returns, as previously suggested in 
the literature (Berk and Green (2004), Gruber (1996), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997)). Complementing those studies, I find that the relationship between 
past returns and future flows is driven mainly by longer-term rather than shorter-term 
performance. This suggests that short-term oriented fund managers will find it more 
difficult to attract assets than long-term oriented fund managers. 
The remainder of the essay is organized as follow: Section II outlines the data and 
the variables used in the analysis. Section III is devoted to the results and section IV 
summarizes the findings.  
Data 
I obtain the mutual fund data from the CRSP Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund 
Database, which includes information on fund returns, total net assets (TNA), fund fees, 
investment objectives, and other fund characteristics. The sample spans the period 1993-
2010, during which CRSP provides consistent classifications of fund investment 
objectives. To compare the results with previous studies, I focus on domestic open-end 
equity funds. Therefore, sector funds, balanced funds, international funds, and bond funds 
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are excluded from the sample. In constructing the sample, I follow Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2002) as closely as possible. Details about data selection are provided in the appendix. 
 CRSP treats different share classes of the same fund as distinct funds. Since the 
classes corresponding to a single fund share the same asset portfolio, their returns are 
correlated. But different share classes may cater to investors with different wealth, 
different investment purposes, and different levels of sophistication (Nanda, Wang, and 
Zheng (2009)). To capture these potential differences across investors, I conduct the 
analysis at the share-class level. Nevertheless, all results are qualitatively similar if I 
combine the multiple share classes of each fund. 
 I define the monthly flow as the net growth rate of total net assets (TNA): 
, , 1 ,
,
, 1
TNA TNA *(1 R )
Flow
TNA
i t i t i t
i t
i t


 
    (2.1) 
where 
,R i t  is the monthly return of fund   during month and ,TNAi t  is the total net asset 
value of fund i at the end of month t This definition adjusts the total net asset for its 
appreciation during month t and therefore reflects the growth rate of the fund due to new 
investments. By using this formula, I implicitly assume that all new investments arrive at 
the end of each quarter. Following Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), and Spiegel and Zhang 
(2010) I filter out the top and bottom of 2.5% tails of the flow data in order to mitigate 
the impact of potential outliers around mergers.
50
  
 I use two monthly performance measures: (i) raw return, (ii) risk-adjusted returns. 
To compute a month’s risk-adjusted return, I first regress excess returns during the 
preceding 36 months (i.e. from t-36 to t-1) onto Carhart's (1997) four factors -market, 
                                               
50 Alternatively, I filter out the top and bottom of 1% tails of the flow data. Moreover, rather than drop 
outlying flow observations, I conduct the analysis using flow data that are winsorized at these levels. In all 
cases, results are similar. 
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size, value, and momentum- and obtain the estimates of factor loadings. To minimize 
estimation errors in the factor loadings, I require at least 24 months of valid returns in the 
estimation period. Then, I estimate the risk-adjusted return in each month t as the 
difference between the fund's realized excess return and the required return, defined as 
the factor loadings times the corresponding factor realizations. Size is defined as the total 
net assets (TNA) of a fund. Age is the number of years since the inception date of a 
fund.
51
 Expense ratio is the fund total operating expenses expressed as a percentage of the 
fund's average net assets. Front load (rear load) measured as a percentage of fund assets is 
the fee investors pay when they buy (redeem) fund shares. Return is the monthly return of 
a fund net of expenses. 
 Fund characteristics are summarized in Table 2.1. Panel A reports cross-sectional 
mean and median values of various fund characteristics while Panel B shows correlations 
among the same variables. The number of funds has increased substantially from 731 in 
1993 to 4295 in 2010. In all years, the median of total net assets per fund is much smaller 
than its corresponding mean, strongly suggesting that assets in the mutual fund industry 
`are concentrated in some big funds. The average age of the funds decreases until 2004 
and increases afterwards. Fund fees including expense ratios and load fees have relatively 
remained stable over time.  
The correlations between fund characteristics reported in Panel B are similar to 
those in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) and Chen et. al. (2004). In particular, fund 
flows are negatively correlated to fund size, age, turnover, and load fees. However, there 
                                               
51 I use "first_offer_date" as a proxy for the fund inception date. 
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is a positive correlation between expense ratios and fund flows.
 52
 All but one of the 
correlations are statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that these 
characteristics should be controlled for in multivariate tests.   
Empirical Tests 
Double Sorts 
In this section, I analyze how future fund flows depend on past returns. I construct 
portfolios sorted on recent and long-term performance. Each month t, I compute recent 
performance as the average raw or risk-adjusted return of a fund over the past three 
months (from t to t-2). Long-term performance is the average of raw or risk-adjusted 
returns of past 24 months from t-27 to t-3.
53
 To construct the portfolios I proceed as 
follows: In each month, I rank all funds into quintiles based on their long-term 
performance. Then, within each quintile, I further divide funds into quintiles according to 
their most recent performance. This creates 25 portfolios, which are held for one month 
after the portfolio formation. Table 2.2 reports the average monthly flows for these 
portfolios in the subsequent month. LT1 (LT5) refers to worst (best) group according to 
its long-term performance averages, while ST1 (ST5) is the worst (best) group based on 
its most recent performance. In Panel A1, performance is measured by raw returns, while 
in Panel A2 performance is measured by risk-adjusted returns. In addition to sequential   
                                               
52 The positive correlation between the expense ratio and the fund flow is unexpected. Chen et. al. (2004) 
also document a positive correlation between these two variables. However, these correlations show 
contemporaneous relationships between two variables.  Since an increase in the expense ratio will decrease 
the net return in the same period, it may cause, all other factors being equal, a mechanical increase in our 
flow calculation due to the second term in our flow formula. 
 
53 I compute recent performance over the past quarter since fund managers are generally subject to 
quarterly relative performance monitoring. In a survey study, Baker (1998) reports this monitoring leads to 
more short-termist attitude and approach to the management of the funds. However, I repeat these tests 
using different horizons: one month and 12 months for recent performance, and 36 months for long-term 
performance. Results are similar when I use these different definitions and are available upon request.  
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel-A presents the cross sectional mean (AVG) and median (ME) values of various fund characteristics at the end of each year from 1993/1 to 2010/12. N is the 
average number of funds. Size is the total net assets of funds (TNA). Age is the number of years since the inception date. Expense ratio is total annual management and 
administrative expenses. Front (rear) load is the fee that investors pay when they buy (redeem) fund shares. Return is the monthly return while flow is the monthly 
percentage change in TNA adjusted for investment returns. Turnover is defined as the minimum of purchases and sales over average TNA. All values except N, size and 
age are in percentages. Panel-B reports the contemporaneous correlations between these characteristics.  
 
Panel A: Key statistics 
 
Year N Size Age Expense Ratio Turnover Front Load Rear Load Return Flow 
    AVG ME AVG ME AVG ME AVG ME AVG ME AVG ME AVG ME AVG ME 
1993 808 601.98 151.77 15.01 8.67 1.20 1.15 77.60 57.10 1.80 0.00 0.56 0.00 2.73 2.50 0.31 -0.16 
1996 1454 739.73 143.19 11.01 5.08 1.34 1.24 86.32 65.63 1.37 0.00 0.72 0.00 -0.7 -0.9 0.45 -0.16 
1998 2246 836.00 124.40 9.36 5.25 1.35 1.25 86.45 69.00 1.11 0.00 0.86 0.00 6.84 6.28 -0.3 -0.83 
2000 3205 739.85 99.40 8.68 5.37 1.40 1.31 109.7 79.00 1.08 0.00 0.99 0.00 4.56 4.31 0.78 -0.18 
2002 3944 417.52 59.20 8.79 6.05 1.48 1.38 105.9 75.00 1.12 0.00 1.06 0.00 -5.4 -5.4 0.21 -0.49 
2004 4754 567.82 77.70 9.00 6.96 1.46 1.37 84.91 63.00 1.07 0.00 1.12 0.00 3.43 3.43 0.34 -0.55 
2006 5081 657.39 82.70 9.70 7.75 1.37 1.30 81.62 62.00 1.03 0.00 1.05 0.00 0.69 0.72 -0.38 -0.79 
2008 5171 404.33 57.30 10.40 8.25 1.25 1.20 87.12 63.00 0.98 0.00 0.79 0.00 3.21 2.99 -0.02 -0.84 
2010 5427 537.23 72.60 11.15 9.27 1.24 1.20 79.22 58.00 0.92 0.00 0.62 0.00 6.30 6.45 0.40 -0.46 
 
Panel B: Piecewise Correlations 
 
 
Size Age Expense Ratio Turnover Front Load Rear Load Return Flow 
Size 1.000 
       Age 0.392 1.000 
      Expense Ratio -0.280 -0.325 1.000 
     Turnover -0.119 0.006 0.111 1.000 
    Front Load 0.114 0.238 -0.518 0.037 1.000 
   Rear Load 0.053 0.069 -0.187 -0.032 0.458 1.000 
  Return 0.009 0.012 0.007 -0.014 -0.006 0.007 1.000 
 Flow -0.011 -0.096 0.025 -0.035 -0.022 -0.003 0.079 1.000 
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sorts, I also construct 25 portfolios using independent sorts on recent and long-term 
performance. Panel B1 and B2 of  Table 2.2 reports the average monthly flows for these 
portfolios In Panel B1, performance is measured by raw returns, while in Panel B2 
performance is measured by risk-adjusted returns. 
The results suggest that long-term winners are punished for poor recent 
performance, because they receive fewer inflows in the next period than long-term 
winners with good recent performance. Similarly, long-term losers are punished more if 
they also have poor recent performance. But the intriguing result is that long-term 
winners receive inflows and long-term losers experience outflows, regardless of their 
recent performance. For example, funds in the top long-term quintile based on risk-
adjusted returns (Panel A2) have positive net flows varying between 1.28% (for the worst 
recent performance) and 4.13% (for the best recent performance). In contrast, funds in the 
worst long-term quintile experience outflows between 1.29% and 0.05%, depending on 
their recent performance. Results are similar when I use independent sorts (see Panel-
B2). 
Changing perspectives, these results also show that short-term returns are more 
important for the best long-term performers. Specifically, the positive relation between 
recent winners and future flows can mostly be attributed to flows into funds that are also 
long-term winners. In particular, 60% of total flows in ST5 in Panel A2 come from the 
funds which are also in LT5, while the recent winners with average long-term 
performance (LT3) attract 13% of total flows in ST5. Moreover, the flow differential 
between ST1 and ST5 increases monotonically from 1.24% to 2.84% as long-term 
performance increases. The results in Panel A1 are similar. Hence, a superior return after 
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Table 2.2. Average Monthly Flow of Funds Sorted on Recent and Long-term Performance Rankings 
 
This table presents the average monthly flow ratios of funds sorted by recent performance and long-term performance rankings. The sample period is from 1993/1 to 
2010/12. Each month t, recent performance is taken as the average raw or risk-adjusted returns of a fund over the past three months (from t to t-2). Long-term 
performance is the average of raw or risk-adjusted returns of past 24 months from t-27 to t-3. To construct the portfolios, in each month, I first rank all funds into 
quintiles based on their long-term performance. Then, within each quintile, I further divide funds into quintiles according to their most recent performance. This 
creates 25 portfolios, which are held for one month after the portfolio formation. Alternatively, I construct 25 portfolios using independent sorts. In Panel A1 and 
B1, performance rankings are based on raw returns. In Panel A2 and B2 performance rankings are based on risk-adjusted returns. LT1 (LT5) refers to worst (best) 
group according to its long-term performance averages, while ST1 (ST10) is the worst (best) group based on its most recent performance ST5-ST1 presents the 
difference of flow ratios between ST5 and ST1; LT5-LT1 presents the difference of flow ratios between LT5 and LT1.Newey and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics 
(up to 3 lags) are reported in parenthesis. All variables are in percentage terms. 
 
Panel A1: Dependent Sorts (Raw returns)              Panel A2: Dependent Sorts (Risk-adjusted returns) 
   
 
LT1 LT2 LT3 LT4 LT5 LT5-LT1 
   
LT1 LT2 LT3 LT4 LT5 LT5-LT1 
 ST1 -1.25 -0.81 -0.26 0.35 1.27 2.52 (11.3) 
 
ST1 -1.29 -0.72 -0.21 0.27 1.28 2.57 (19.6) 
ST2 -1.06 -0.31 0.20 0.90 1.88 2.94 (14.3) 
 
ST2 -0.74 -0.38 0.24 0.63 1.96 2.70 (14.8) 
ST3 -0.88 -0.15 0.56 1.05 2.31 3.19 (14.1) 
 
ST3 -0.51 -0.02 0.25 0.90 2.33 2.84 (22.9) 
ST4 -0.60 0.15 0.74 1.33 2.86 3.46 (13.7) 
 
ST4 -0.44 -0.03 0.51 1.08 2.77 3.21 (18.4) 
ST5 -0.17 0.53 1.25 2.03 4.81 4.98 (17.9) 
 
ST5 -0.05 0.26 0.85 1.61 4.13 4.18 (18.4) 
                 ST5-
ST1 1.08 1.34 1.51 1.68 3.54 
   
ST5-
ST1 1.24 0.98 1.06 1.34 2.85 
  
 
(6.4) (9.8) (10.3) (11.0) (15.3) 
    
(10.5) (10.8) (10.9) (13.5) (15.1) 
   
Panel B1: Independent Sorts (Raw returns)                                                                   Panel B2: Independent Sorts (Risk-adjusted returns) 
   
 
LT1 LT2 LT3 LT4 LT5 LT5-LT1 
   
LT1 LT2 LT3 LT4 LT5 LT5-LT1 
 ST1 -1.28 -0.84 -0.38 0.23 1.08 2.35 (13.4) 
 
ST1 -1.19 -0.73 -0.24 0.28 1.27 2.46 (19.9) 
ST2 -1.08 -0.37 0.19 0.84 2.06 3.13 (15.2) 
 
ST2 -0.55 -0.33 0.18 .58 1.96 2.52 (18.1) 
ST3 -0.81 -0.08 0.57 1.00 2.26 3.07 (21.8) 
 
ST3 -0.54 -0.08 0.28 0.85 2.28 2.83 (20.5) 
ST4 -0.62 0.19 0.76 1.48 2.74 3.36 (24.3) 
 
ST4 -0.40 -0.04 0.52 1.08 2.58 2.98 (23.8) 
ST5 -0.02 0.59 1.38 2.09 4.73 4.75 (21.9) 
 
ST5 -0.01 0.35 0.91 1.66 3.78 3.78 (23.3) 
                 ST5-
ST1 1.26 1.44 1.75 1.86 3.65 
   
ST5-
ST1 1.19 1.08 1.16 1.38 2.51 
  
 
(7.0) (6.8) (7.8) (10.3) (14.3) 
    
(9.4) (11.3) (10.8) (11.3) (14.5) 
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a period of a good performance has more influence on flows than a superior return after a 
period of mediocre performance. This is consistent with the idea that investors divert 
their capital to the funds in which they are confident about the manager's ability.  
 Regression Analysis 
 In this section, I adopt a regression approach to control for multiple fund 
characteristics simultaneously. I first analyze the impact of long-term performance on the 
overall level of sensitivity of flows to recent performance. In particular, I run a regression 
that includes recent performance, long-term performance and the interaction terms 
between these variables. Later in the paper, I consider a piecewise-linear specification 
used in Sirri and Tufano (1998). Specifically, recent performance is divided into three 
regions- Low, Mid, High- to capture the documented convex flow-performance relation. I 
use these three regions, interaction terms between these regions and long-term 
performance, and long-term performance itself. This specification tests how the long-
term performance affects the convexity of flow-performance relation. 
The Effect of Long-term Performance on the Overall Flow-Performance Relation 
 
 To estimate the effect of long-term performance on the relation between flows 
and short term performance, I run the following specification: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , ,
,
Flow β STPerf β LTPerf β STPerf LTPerf
               +Controls
i t i t i t i t i t
i t
       
 (2.2)
 
where 
,STPerfi t  and ,LTPerfi t  are short-term and long-term performance rankings of 
fund i in month t. To compute short-term performance rankings ( ,STPerfi t ), I proceed as 
follows: Each month t, I rank all funds according to their recent performance, measured 
as the average raw or risk-adjusted returns during previous three months (from t-2 to t). 
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Then I assign performance ranks (
,STPerfi t ), that are uniformly distributed between 0 
(worst) and 1 (best). For raw returns, funds are ranked within their investment categories; 
for risk adjusted, all funds are ranked together. Similarly, 
,LTPerfi t  is the performance 
rank of funds (from 0 to 1) according to the raw or risk-adjusted returns during the 
previous 24 months from t-27 to t-3. The coefficient of the interaction term-
3β - captures 
the conditional effect of long-term performance on the sensitivity of flows to recent 
performance. Control variables include the total risk of a fund measured by the standard 
deviation of the returns over the preceding 24 months, logarithm of age, fund size 
measured by the logarithm of total net assets, expense ratio, load fees, monthly fund 
flows, and aggregate flow into each investment category. These variables are known to 
affect fund flows (Sirri and Tufano (1998), Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), Del Guercio 
and Tkac (2008)). I also use dummy variables for investment styles (Bergstresser and 
Poterba (2002)). All control variables are lagged at least one month. To estimate the 
regression parameters, I use Fama and MacBeth's (1978) approach. Standard errors are 
corrected autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the method of Newey and West 
(1987) with three lags. In addition, I also estimate the regression using Pooled OLS with 
standard errors clustered by month. 
 Table 2.3 presents the parameter estimates as well as the corresponding t-
statistics. The coefficients on control variables show that fund size negatively affect 
future flows. This is consistent with Berk and Green's (2004) model, in which flows 
cease due to the decreasing returns to scale in performance as size grows. Furthermore, 
consistent with the extant literature, older funds as well as funds with higher expenses 
and turnover and turnover have on average lower future flows.  
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Table 2.3. The Effect of Long-Term Performance on the Sensitivity of Fund Flows 
to Recent Performance 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth's (1973) and pooled OLS regressions of monthly 
observations for funds from 1993/1 to 2010/12. The dependent variable is the monthly flow ratio. StPerf is the 
performance rank of funds (from 0 to 1) according to the raw or risk-adjusted returns during the previous three months 
from t-3 to t-1. LTPerf is the performance rank of funds (from 0 to 1) according to the raw or risk-adjusted returns 
during the previous 24 months from t-28 to t-4  Other control variables include volatility of the past 24-month returns, 
turnover, expense ratios, logarithm of fund age, and logarithm of fund size as proxied by funds total net assets. All 
control variables are lagged at least one month. All specifications include style dummies. Column (1) and (2) report 
parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth's (1973) regressions. Newey and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics (up to 3 
lags) are reported in parenthesis. Second column shows the coefficients from pooled OLS. Standard errors are clustered 
by month. 
 
 
Raw Returns Risk-adjusted Returns 
 
Fama-Macbeth Pooled OLS Fama-MacBeth Pooled OLS 
     STPerf 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 
(5.77) (5.29) (8.84) (7.66) 
     LTPerf 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 
(15.24) (12.19) (19.36) (20.64) 
     STPerf*LTPerf 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 
(12.83) (7.46) (10.38) (10.64) 
     Flow 0.402*** 0.418*** 0.414*** 0.425*** 
 
(53.91) (62.40) (52.36) (63.38) 
     Log(Age) -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
(-29.17) (-32.81) (-30.73) (-32.80) 
     Log(Size) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 
(-13.41) (-8.10) (-8.95) (-4.95) 
     Cat. Flow 15.986 0.255*** 15.978 0.197*** 
 
(1.12) (4.61) (1.11) (3.68) 
     Exp. Ratio -0.312*** -0.470*** -0.327*** -0.454*** 
 
(-5.83) (-16.42) (-6.82) (-16.21) 
     Turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 
(0.64) (0.62) (0.93) (1.88) 
     
     Volatility -0.084*** 0.007 0.037 0.010 
 
(-3.67) (0.58) (1.47) (0.81) 
     Load -0.008 -0.015*** -0.007 -0.014*** 
 
(-1.38) (-3.90) (-1.25) (-3.84) 
     N 659243 659243 636179 636179 
R-sq 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 
 
 
Regarding the flow-performance relationship, the coefficients of interaction terms 
- 3β - are 0.016 in Fama and MacBeth's (1973) regression and 0.014 in pooled OLS, when 
raw returns are used.  Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
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suggesting that long-term performance increases the sensitivity of flows to recent 
performance. Results are similar when risk-adjusted returns are used. Moreover, the 
coefficients of long-term performance are three times greater than those of short-term 
performance. This implies that the effect of long-term performance on flows is greater 
than that of short-term performance. For instance, when raw returns are used, moving 
five percentiles in the long term rankings will increase flows by 0.12% per month for a 
fund that is in the 50
th
 performance percentile according short-term rankings (≈5% x 
(0.016+0.016 x 0.5)). However, moving five percentiles in the short term rankings will 
increase flows 0.07% per month for a fund that is in the 50
th
 percentile according to long-
term performance (≈5% x (0.006+0.016 x 0.5)). Overall the results suggest that investors 
condition their response to recent performance on the long-term performance history. 
Prior research shows that age affects the sensitivity of flow to recent performance 
(Chevalier and Ellison (1997, 1998), and Huang Wei, and Yan (2012).  Specifically, fund 
flows into young funds are more sensitive to recent performance than flows into older 
funds. Huang, Wei, and Yan (2012) argue that age is related to the uncertainty associated 
with the fund quality, and since younger funds have less historical data, investors should 
rely on more recent performance in their decisions. In addition to age, Sawicki and Finn 
(2002) find that investors respond more strongly to recent performance of small and 
young funds than to recent performance of large and old funds. Age or size does not 
necessarily imply a better long-term performance. Nevertheless, in order to see whether 
investors capture the same information from long-term performance like from age or size, 
I divide all funds into age or size quintiles (Q1: lowest quantile, Q5: highest quintile) , 
and conduct my tests within each quintile. Table 2.4 shows the parameter estimates of 
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STPerf, LTPerf, and STPerf x LTPerf from Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions. 
54
 
Considering the age quintiles, we observe that the coefficients of STPerf decrease from 
0.011 in Q1 to 0.005 in Q5 and the difference is statistically significant. The coefficient 
of interaction term does not change significantly even though there is a drop in 
magnitudes. This suggest that for the same long-term performance, the effect of recent 
performance on future flows is greater among young funds as documented in Chevalier 
and Ellision (1997,1998), and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2011). However, the effect of long-
term performance on the flow-recent performance relation does not change across age 
quintiles. Similar results are obtained for the size quintiles. Overall, the findings suggest 
that the age or size effect does not subsume the effect of long-term performance on the 
sensitivity of flows to recent performance.    
The Effect of Long-term Performance on the Convexity of Flow-Performance Relation 
 Previous literature documents that the sensitivity of future flows to recent past 
performance is not linear (Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Sirri and 
Tufano (1998)). To model the non-linearity in the flow-performance relation, I follow 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) and divide the short-term performance rankings 
,STPerfi t  
into 
three groups: 
, ,Low min(STPerf ,0.2)i t i t , , , ,Mid min(STPerf Low ,0.6)i t i t i t  , 
, , , ,High Rank Mid Lowi t i t i t i t   . Using these fractional ranks, I run the following 
piecewise linear regression: 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , ,
5 , , 6 , , ,
Flow β Low β Mid β High β Low LTPerf
              β Mid LTPerf β igh LTPerf Controls
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i tH
         
      
 
(2.3) 
                                               
54 Pooled OLS results are similar and omitted for brevity. 
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Table 2.4. The Effect of Long-term Performance on the Sensitivity of Fund Flows to Recent Performance Across Age 
and Size Groups 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth's (1973) for funds from 1993/1 to 2010/12 for different size and age quintiles. Each month, I sort the 
funds according to their total net assets or their age. Q1 refers to the group of funds with lowest total net assets (age), while Q5 is the group of funds with highest total net 
assets. Regressions are performed within each group. The dependent variable is the monthly flow ratio. StPerf is the performance rank of funds (from 0 to 1) according to 
the raw or risk-adjusted returns during the previous three months from t-3 to t-1. LTPerf is the performance rank of funds (from 0 to 1) according to the raw or risk-
adjusted returns during the previous 24 months from t-28 to t-4  Other control variables (not reported) include volatility of the past 24-month returns, turnover, expense 
ratios, logarithm of fund age, and logarithm of fund size as proxied by funds total net assets. All control variables are lagged at least one month. All specifications 
include style dummies. Newey and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics (up to 3 lags) are reported in parenthesis. The table also reposts the the p-values from a Chow test, 
that determines whether the coefficients of estimates between Q5 and Q1 are statistically different from each other . 
 
 
Fama-Macbeth Regressions within each age quintile Fama-Macbeth Regressions within each size quintile 
 
Raw returns 
 
Raw returns 
 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Q5-Q1 
 (p-values) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Q5-Q1  
(p-values) 
STPerf 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.016 
 
(5.66) (3.77) (4.85) (3.56) (4.86)   (5.31) (3.37) (2.81) (4.21) (3.48) 
 
      
  
      LTPerf 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.027 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.390 
 
(8.64) (12.38) (12.56) (11.98) (11.43)   (9.88) (8.99) (8.82) (12.04) (9.46) 
 
      
  
      STPerf*LTPerf 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.143 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.139 
 
(5.53) (8.11) (8.90) (8.23) (6.90)   (6.67) (7.61) (9.40) (7.77) (6.54) 
 
             
 
Risk-adjusted returns 
 
Risk-adjusted returns 
 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Q5-Q1 
(p-values) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Q5-Q1 
(p-values) 
STPerf 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.037 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.000 
 
(6.48) (3.40) (4.73) (4.69) (6.88)   (5.84) (4.00) (3.11) (5.77) (3.99) 
 
      
  
      LTPerf 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.081 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.438 
 
(7.55) (11.23) (11.68) (12.19) (13.07)   (8.78) (8.85) (10.02) (13.11) (12.23) 
 
      
  
      STPerf*LTPerf 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.275 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.980 
 
(4.35) (7.13) (6.13) (4.85) (4.52)   (4.00) (6.48) (5.23) (6.34) (5.50) 
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where 
,LTPerfi t  is the performance rank of funds (from 0 to 1) according to the raw or  
risk-adjusted returns during the previous 24 months from t-27 to t-3. This specification 
allows the sensitivity of flow to recent performance to change at three different 
performance levels. Hence, we can analyze whether long-term performance has different 
effects among short-term winners and losers. 
  To confirm the convexity of flow-performance relation in the sample, I first run 
regressions without interaction terms. Table 2.5 presents the parameter estimates as well 
as the corresponding t-statistics for Fama and MacBeth's (1973) and pooled OLS 
regressions. In all specifications, the flow sensitivity to different performance levels is 
positive and significant. However, it is much higher for High than for Mid and Low. For 
instance, when raw returns are used, the coefficient of High is 0.055 in the Fama and 
Macbeth's (1973) regression, while it is 0.049 in the pooled regression. The 
corresponding coefficients for Low are 0.022 and 0.014. Results for risk-adjusted returns 
are very similar. A Wald test of the equality of coefficients between High and Low is 
rejected at 1% significance level.
55
  
 While all performance categories experience inflows, I also find that low 
performance leads to greater inflows than average performance. This differs from Sirri 
and Tufano (1998), who find an insignificant coefficient for the Low rank. In this respect, 
my results are very similar to those in Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007) and Spiegel and   
Zhang (2010), who find a positive significant coefficient for the Low rank as well. 
Actually, Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007) argue that in the 1990s, flows become 
significantly more sensitive in the low and medium performance ranges due to the  
                                               
55 The sensitivity of Mid rank is lower than Low rank, suggesting concavity as performance decreases. This 
pattern is also documented in Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), and Spiegel and Zhang (2010). However, my 
focus is mainly in the relation between High and Low. 
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Table 2.5. Unconditional Flow-Performance Relation 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth's (1973) and pooled OLS regressions of monthly 
observations for funds from 1993/1 to 2010/12. The dependent variable is the monthly flow ratio. Low, Mid, and High 
correspond to fractional rankings of raw returns or risk-adjusted returns over the previous three months. Other control 
variables include volatility of the past 24-month returns, turnover, expense ratios, logarithm of fund age, and logarithm 
of fund size as proxied by funds total net assets. All control variables are lagged one month. All specifications include 
style dummies. Column (1) and (2) report parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth's (1973) regressions. Newey 
and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics (up to 3 lags) are reported in parenthesis. Second column shows the coefficients 
from pooled OLS. Standard errors are clustered by month. 
 
 
Raw Returns Risk-adjusted Returns 
 
Fama-Macbeth Pooled OLS Fama-MacBeth Pooled OLS 
     Low 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 
 
(7.58) (7.07) (10.36) (11.59) 
     Mid 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(11.29) (13.11) (12.14) (12.12) 
     High 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 
 
(18.92) (16.61) (13.80) (15.64) 
     Flow 0.432*** 0.443*** 0.438*** 0.448*** 
 
(57.39) (63.84) (54.86) (61.91) 
     Log(Age) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
(-31.62) (-36.04) (-29.71) (-34.50) 
     Log(Size) -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 
 
(-5.18) (-2.08) (-4.02) (-1.60) 
     Car. Flow 15.643 0.214*** 15.597 0.203*** 
 
(1.08) (4.05) (1.13) (3.81) 
     Exp. Ratio -0.370*** -0.497*** -0.378*** -0.503*** 
 
(-7.84) (-17.95) (-8.19) (-18.09) 
     Turnover -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
 
(-2.96) (-1.36) (-2.23) (-1.30) 
     Volatility -0.020 0.001 0.013 0.006 
 
(-0.78) (0.09) (0.48) (0.46) 
     Load -0.010* -0.014*** -0.011* -0.017*** 
 
(-1.68) (-3.74) (-1.90) (-4.52) 
     N 662205 662205 648140 648140 
R-sq 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 
 
 
substantial decrease in participation costs. This supports the idea that investors may  
have certain level of confidence about managers' ability. Hence, some investors that have 
a certain level of sophistication may choose to incorporate long-term performance history 
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into their evaluation of the quality of recent signals and therefore, into investment 
decision process.  
Next, I run the conditional regressions that include the interaction terms.  Table 2.6 
reports the parameter estimates and the corresponding t-statistics. The interaction terms 
are positive and significant, meaning that as long-term performance increases, the 
sensitivity of flows to recent performance also increases in all performance levels. Using 
parameter estimates in column (1), the sensitivity of fund flows to recent performance 
changes in the lowest performance category Low is given by:   
Flow
0.010 0.021*LTPerf
Low

 

. This means any performance increase in the lowest 
performance category is associated with significantly greater inflows if the fund has a 
good long-term performance than a similar move if the fund has a bad long-term 
performance. For instance, consider that a fund in the      category moves from 10th 
percentile to 15
th
 percentile.
56
 This five percentiles move will increase fund flows by 
0.15% per month (≈5% x (0.010 + 0.021 x 0.9)) if the fund is in the 90th percentile 
according to its long-term performance. The corresponding increase in fund flows is 
0.06%  per month if the fund is in the 10
th
 percentile according to its long-term 
performance. The impact of long-term performance is even greater in the High category. 
The sensitivity of fund flows to performance change in this category is given by: 
Flow
0.011 0.076 LTPerf
High

  

. Hence, long-term performance affects the relation 
between recent performance and flows more among funds with better recent 
performance. By the same token, given two funds that are recent losers (winners), the one  
                                               
56 Note that Low can take values from 0 to 0.2 (20th percentile). 
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Table 2.6. Conditional Flow-Performance Relation 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and Macbeth (1973) and pooled OLS regressions of monthly 
observations for funds from 1993/1 to 2010/12. The dependent variable is the monthly flow ratio. Low, Mid, and High 
correspond to fractional rankings of raw returns or risk-adjusted returns over the previous three months. Other control 
variables include volatility of the past 24-month returns, turnover, expense ratios, logarithm of fund age, and logarithm 
of fund size as proxied by funds total net assets. All control variables are lagged one month. All specifications include 
style dummies. Column (1) and (2) report parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth's (1973) regressions. Newey 
and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics (up to 3 lags) are reported in parenthesis. Second column shows the coefficients 
from pooled OLS. Standard errors are clustered by time.  
 
 
Raw Returns Risk-adjusted Returns 
 
Fama-Macbeth Pooled OLS Fama-MacBeth Pooled OLS 
     Low 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 
(2.73) (3.75) (4.96) (5.62) 
     Mid 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.001* 
 
(4.22) (3.97) (2.27) (1.90) 
     High 0.011* 0.012** 0.021*** 0.017*** 
 
(1.82) (2.14) (4.86) (4.66) 
     Low*LTPerf 0.021*** 0.008 0.013** 0.011** 
 
(3.19) (1.33) (2.46) (2.38) 
     Mid*LTPerf 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
(3.69) (3.49) (4.47) (4.33) 
     High*LTPerf 0.076*** 0.060*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 
 
(6.96) (5.83) (4.16) (5.62) 
     LTPerf 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 
(13.84) (10.43) (13.32) (14.46) 
     Flow 0.399*** 0.417*** 0.412*** 0.424*** 
 
(53.57) (62.28) (52.37) (63.51) 
     Log(Age) -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 
(-29.28) (-33.16) (-30.29) (-32.92) 
     Log(Size) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 
(-13.13) (-8.09) (-8.83) (-5.01) 
     Car. Flow 14.788 0.257*** 15.229 0.197*** 
 
(1.08) (4.62) (1.10) (3.67) 
     Exp. Ratio -0.322*** -0.482*** -0.335*** -0.465*** 
 
(-5.94) (-16.93) (-6.92) (-16.75) 
     Turnover 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.32) (0.21) (0.75) (1.63) 
     Volatility -0.099*** 0.004 0.028 0.008 
 
(-4.14) (0.30) (1.11) (0.61) 
     Load -0.007 -0.014*** -0.007 -0.014*** 
 
(-1.18) (-3.64) (-1.23) (-3.72) 
     N 659243 659243 636179 636179 
R-sq 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 
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with a worse long-term performance will lose more flows than the one with a better 
performance history.  
To better understand the conditional effect of long-term performance, I plot the 
sensitivity of fund flows to recent performance as a function of long-term performance. 
Specifically, I gradually increase long-term performance ranking (LTPerf) from 0 to 1 by 
a factor of 0.1 and, for each LTPerf percentile, I compute the sensitivity of flows in in the 
Low and Hig category.
 57
  Figure 2.1 plots the sensitivity of flows in the High and Low as 
well as the difference (convexity) between the sensitivity of flows in these two categories 
using parameter estimates from Fama and MacBeth's (1978) regressions. Panel A uses 
rankings computed from raw returns, while Panel B uses rankings computed from risk-
adjusted returns. Both graphs suggest that flows' response to performance gets stronger in 
High and Low as long term rankings increase. However, the increase in High category is 
greater than the increase in the Low category. This suggests that long-term performance 
affects the convexity of flow performance relation.  
In my first essay, I show that maximum-style adjusted daily returns over a month 
affect future fund flows. This finding is in line with the idea that investors have a 
preference for lottery-like payoffs, which are high positive payoffs with relatively small 
probabilities. In order to see whether my results are robust to control for lottery-like 
preferences, I run my Fama and Macbeth’s (1973) regressions after including maximum 
style-adjusted daily returns (MAX) over a month as a control variable. Table 2.7 shows 
the coefficients of MAX, long-term performance and interaction of long-term 
performance with recent performance. 
                                               
57 For instance, when LTPerf is 0.2, then the total effect of Low is 0.011+0.017*0.2=0.014 based on the 
parameter estimates in column (1) of Table 2.6. 
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Figure 2.1. Sensitivity of Fund Flows to Recent Performance as a Function of Long-
term Performance 
This figure plots the sensitivity of flows to recent performance in the High and Low category as a function of long term 
performance ranking (LTPerf). Long term rankings are gradually increased from 0 to 1 by a factor of 0.1. Then, for 
each percentile of long term rankings, the total effect of recent performance onto flows is calculated using the 
coefficient estimates from Fama and MacBeth's (1973) regression reported in column (1) and (2) of Table 2.6. Panel A 
use coefficients estimated when raw returns are used; Panel B use coefficients estimated when risk-adjusted returns are 
used. In both panels, High-Low refers to the difference (convexity) between the sensitivity of flows in these two 
categories. 
 
Panel A: Rankings based on raw returns  
 
 
 
Panel B: Rankings based on risk-adjusted returns  
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The results show that MAX and long-term performance as well as the interaction terms 
are highly significant, suggesting that no variable subsume the effect of other variable. 
Presumably, consumers gather information from a variety of sources about alternative 
mutual funds and develop a set of fund attributes that are important to them from their 
information set. In this process, they may well adopt a multi-attribute model in 
determining their choices (Fishbein and Azjen (1975), Lanchaster (1966), and Capon, 
Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996)). As a result, the existence of a preference for lottery-like 
returns does not necessarily preclude that some investors would positively value long-
term performance or vice versa. The value that investors attach to long-term performance 
and lottery-like returns may differ among different clientele. Accordingly, Genc (2012) 
show that preference for lottery-like payoffs only exist in retail funds, which 
predominantly cater to individual investors. Nevertheless, as long as long a sizable 
portion of investors consider these fund characteristics in their purchase decisions, we 
can observe the effect of both fund characteristics on fund flows. Moreover, it is also 
important to emphasize that since investors’ utility functions are unobservable, one 
cannot argue a preference for lottery-like payoffs show investors’ unsophistication. As 
discussed in my first essay, investors may derive utility from this preference and they 
optimally choose these funds as a result of a utility maximization. Actually, it is also 
arguable that following long-term performance might be a non-optimal decision given the 
fact that long-term performance in mutual funds does not persist (Carhart (1997)).  
Granger Causality Tests 
My multivariate regressions reflect correlations between performance and future fund 
flows, but they do not reveal direct information about causality between these variables. 
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Table 2.7. The Effect of Long-term Performance after Controlling for MAX 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates from Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions of monthly observations for 
funds from 1998/9 to 2010/12. StPerf is the performance rank of funds (from 0 to 1) according to the raw or risk-
adjusted returns during the previous three months from t-3 to t-1. LTPerf is the performance rank of funds (from 0 to 1) 
according to the raw or risk-adjusted returns during the previous 24 months from t-28 to t-4.Low, Mid, and High 
correspond to fractional rankings of raw returns or risk-adjusted returns over the previous three months. Other control 
variables (omitted for brevity) include volatility of the past 24-month returns, turnover, expense ratios, logarithm of 
fund age, and logarithm of fund size as proxied by funds total net assets. All control variables are lagged one month. 
All specifications include style dummies. Newey and West (1987) adjusted t-statistics (up to 3 lags) are reported in 
parenthesis.  
 
 
Raw returns Risk-adjusted returns 
MAX 0.276*** 0.229*** 0.260*** 0.235*** 
 
(7.31) (6.34) (7.30) (6.92) 
     STPerf 0.005*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
 
(4.10) 
 
(6.73) 
 
     LTPerf 0.015*** 
 
0.011*** 
 
 
(11.63) 
 
(16.16) 
 
     STPerf*LTPerf 0.015*** 
 
0.009*** 
 
 
(11.47) 
 
(8.26) 
 
     Low 
 
0.012*** 
 
0.012*** 
  
(3.10) 
 
(4.41) 
     Mid 
 
0.005*** 
 
0.002* 
  
(3.09) 
 
(1.82) 
     High 
 
0.013** 
 
0.020*** 
  
(2.25) 
 
(4.60) 
     Low*LTPerf 0.015** 
 
0.015*** 
  
(2.14) 
 
(3.47) 
     Mid*LTPerf 0.008*** 
 
0.006*** 
  
(4.09) 
 
(3.91) 
     High*LTPerf 0.062*** 
 
0.028*** 
  
(6.69) 
 
(3.09) 
 
 
For instance, Gruber (1996) shows that funds with higher cash flows perform better in the 
future, indicating that fund flows can be used as the predictor of fund performance.  Even 
though the “smart money” effect of Gruber (1996) is shown to be short-lived, it is 
confined to small funds and partially explained by strategies of betting on winners 
(Zheng (1999), Sapp and Tiwari (2004), Frazzini and Lamont (2008)). This raises the 
possibility of causality going in the opposite direction i.e. that flows lead to superior 
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performance at least in the short run.  Therefore, in this section, I look at this issue by 
performing Granger causality tests. 
Granger causality test determines whether one time series is useful in forecasting 
another.  For example, a time series X is said to Granger cause another time-series Y if 
lagged values of X (in the presence of lagged values of Y) provide information about the 
future values of Y. To conduct the test, I first obtain a time-series of performance and 
flows for fund portfolios sorted on (a) size (b) age, and (c) styles. Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997) study the flow-performance relation across age regions. They show that flows to 
young funds are more sensitive to recent performance. Combining size and age, Sawicki 
and Finn (2002) find that investors respond more strongly to recent performance of small 
and young funds than to recent performance of large and old funds. To control for this 
size and age effect on the flow-performance relation, I first sort the fund into quintiles 
based on size or age (i.e. five size and five age portfolios). I also create fund portfolios 
based on five styles- capital appreciation, growth and income, income, growth, and small 
growth. For each of these fifteen portfolios, I calculate the performance using the average 
of three month returns and average fund flows. Then, I run Granger causality test using a 
Vector Auto Regression (VAR) framework. The test examines the causal relation 
between the average of prior three month return and fund flows, and between the fund 
flows and the average of the following three month returns. To estimate VAR properly, 
stationary data is needed. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests show no evidence of non-
stationarity in both return and flow series.
58
 Another practical issue in VAR is 
                                               
58 In all size and age quintiles, and style groups, the null hypothesis that return (flow) series has a unit root 
is rejected at 1% level. Only exception is the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% for the flow series in the 
lowest two size quintiles and the highest age quintiles.  
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determining the number of lags used for the endogenous variables. Too many lags could 
increase the errors in the forecasts; too few could leave out relevant information. I use 
Akaike’s information criterion to select the number of lags.59 Table 2.8 reports the 2  
and the corresponding p-values. In all tests, the null hypothesis, that prior three month 
performance does not Granger cause flows           ),  is rejected at 1%, while the 
hypothesis that flow does not Granger cause performance cannot be rejected. Thus, the 
table shows a strong one way Granger causality from performance to flows, while there is 
no evidence of a reverse causality.   
Chapter Conclusion 
Previous research shows that investors are insensitive to recent poor performance but 
disproportionally flock to funds with the best recent performance. In this paper, I study 
how a fund’s longer-term performance affects this relationship. I find that investors take 
into account recent performance, but the main driver of future fund flows is longer-term 
historical performance. Specifically, long-term winners can afford a losing quarter, while 
long-term losers cannot increase their flows by boosting their recent performance. These 
findings imply that short-termism on behalf of fund managers may not be a competitively 
viable strategy, because fund investors see through attempts to boost short-term 
performance at the expense of long-term performance.  
  
 
 
                                               
59 Other commonly used information criteria are Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and the 
Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC). Using simulations, Ivanov and Kilian (2005) conclude 
that for monthly VAR models AIC tends to produce the most accurate estimates for realistic sample sizes. 
Nevertheless, the number of lags selected by these three methods generally coincides in my sample. 
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Table 2.8. Granger Causality Tests 
 
This table shows Granger causality tests between short-term performance and percentage flows within (a) 
each size quintiles, (b) within each age quintiles (c) within each style. Q1 is the portfolio of funds with the 
smallest total net assets or age, Q5 is the portfolio of funds with greatest total net assets or age. Short-term 
performance is the average of three month returns and flow is the average of percentage flows.. In each 
case, I first test the null hypothesis that performance  from t-3 to t-1 does not Granger cause flows in month 
t and then whether flow in month t does not Granger cause performance from t+1 to t+3. For each test, I 
report 
2  and the corresponding p-value. I use Akaike’s information criterion to determine the number of 
lags. 
  
Granger Causality within each size quintiles 
  
    
Null Hypothesis Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 erf  Flow 
     
             
2  41.222 75.594 69.211 90.051 69.189 
           p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
Flow   erf 
     
             
2  5.642 7.449 7.395 8.868 4.618 
p-value 0.69 0.49 0.49 0.35 0.79 
      Granger Causality within age quintiles 
      Null Hypothesis Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 erf  Flow 
     
             
2  89.545 78.972 49.538 48.48 36.685 
          p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
Flow   er  
     
            
2  9.682 7.573 5.464 5.789 5.905 
          p-value 0.28 0.48 0.71 0.67 0.66 
      Granger Causality within each styles 
      
Null Hypothesis CA GI GR I SG 
 erf  Flow 
     
            
2  85.182 30.69 86.529 17.176 81.468 
          p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 
      
Flow   erf 
     
           
2  10.9333 4.572 8.396 3.903 7.334 
          p-value 0.21 0.8 0.39 0.87 0.5 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation I analyze how investors make their fund choices. In the first 
essay, I study whether investors' trading decisions are influenced by a preference for 
lottery-like features (i.e. high payoffs with small probabilities) in asset returns. Using 
maximum style-adjusted daily returns (MAX) as a proxy for lottery-like returns, I show 
that investors are attracted to funds that provide lottery-like returns. Specifically, I 
document a positive and significant relation between MAX and flows, which is robust to 
various control variables including fund performance, fund size, age, turnover, fund fees, 
(idiosyncratic) volatility, and (idiosyncratic) skewness of fund returns. This flow-MAX 
relationship exists only among funds that cater primarily to retail investors, suggesting that 
predominantly retail investors are subject to this type of preference. Moreover, I document 
that MAX in a period predicts MAX in future periods. Therefore, if lottery-like features 
enter investors’ utility function and valuable to investors, then choosing such funds may be 
optimal. However, this MAX-based strategies are costly to investors as funds with high 
MAX subsequently underperform otherwise similar funds on a risk-adjusted basis. 
In the second essay, I investigate the role of recent and long-term performance on 
future fund flows using a conditional setting. Previous research shows that investors are 
insensitive to recent poor performance but disproportionally flock to funds with the best 
recent performance. This flow-performance relation incentives fund managers to compete 
in the short-term, and take myopic investment decisions at the expense of long-term 
performance (Lin and Kogan (2005)). I find that even though recent performance is 
important for investors, the effect of recent performance on fund flows is highly 
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dependent on long-term performance. Specifically, long-term winners can afford a losing 
quarter, while long-term losers cannot increase their flows by boosting their recent 
performance. Hence, short-termism on behalf of fund managers may not be a 
competitively viable strategy, because fund investors see through attempts to boost short-
term performance at the expense of long-term performance.  
 The findings of the first and second essay imply that consumers use a complex 
multi-attribute model when optimizing their fund choices. The value that investors attach 
to long-term performance and lottery-like returns may differ among different clientele. 
Accordingly, I show that preference for lottery-like payoffs only exist in retail funds, 
which predominantly cater to individual investors. Nevertheless, as long as long a sizable 
portion of investors consider these fund characteristics in their purchase decisions, we 
can observe the effect of both fund characteristics on fund flows.  
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APPENDIX  
SAMPLE SELECTION 
I start with the CRSP fund summary file, which includes yearly observations of 
fund characteristics except the returns and total net assets. The selection criterion is based 
on the fund objectives. There are two different fund objectives in this CRSP file after 
1993: Strategic Insights (SI) objective codes, and Lipper objective codes. These codes 
cover two different time periods: the Strategic Insights objective code is available 
between 1993 and 1998; and the Lipper objective code exists after 1999. To determine 
the equity funds, we select the funds with the following codes. 
 (1) Strategic Insights codes (SI_OBJ_CD): AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, SCG 
 (2) Lipper objective codes (LIPPER_OBJ_CD): CA, I, G, GI, I, MC, MR, SG 
Then I regroup the funds into 5 classes: 
(1) Capital appreciation- LIPPER_OBJ_CD: CA 
(2) Growth & Income- SI_OBJ_CD: GRI; LIPPER_OBJ_CD: GI 
(3) Income- SI_OBJ_CD: ING; LIPPER_OBJ_CD: EI,I  
(4) Growth- SI_OBJ_CD: AGG, GRO,GMC; LIPPER_OBJ_CD: MC, G 
(5) Small Growth- SI_OBJ_CD: SCG; LIPPER_OBJ_CD: SG, MR 
An objective code in its valid period may be missing for a fund in some years. If a 
code is missing in a particular year but is available for that fund in a later or earlier year, 
then we keep that observation and fill the code with its earlier or later classification. 
Funds with "index fund flag" equal to "D” are further deleted from the sample because 
they are pure index funds. However, this flag is available only after June 2008. Hence, I 
also make a name search to identify index funds. Following Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdύ 
 95 
 
(2009), I code a fund as an index fund if its name contains any of the following strings: 
"Index", "Idx", "Ix", "Indx", "NASDAQ", "Nasdaq", "Dow", "Mkt", "DJ", "S&P 500", 
and "BARRA". Evans (2010) points out a strategy in which fund families start multiple 
new funds and open some of them to the public at the end of an evaluation periods and 
terminate the others. This strategy creates an upward bias in fund returns. To address this 
incubation bias, we exclude the fund with missing CRSP names and that are less than 2 
years old. CRSP calculates returns from one non-missing net asset value (NAV) to 
another. Hence, when I observe a missing NAV, I delete the next month return. Elton, 
Gruber, and Blake (2001) find an upward bias in the returns of small funds. Moreover, 
the incubation bias documented in Evans (2010) tends to be concentrated in small funds. 
Therefore, we exclude the funds with total net asset below $5 million in the previous 
month to partially address these concerns
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